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Preface  2 
Every major economic crisis changes certain fundamental beliefs and practices of the economists 
and policy makers who are involved in explaining them and dealing with their aftermath. The Great 
Depression, for example, revealed that the economy would not get back on track by itself with 
numerous laissez-faire policies in place. Only after paradigm shifts in monetary policy ‒ the dilution 
of the gold standard ‒ and fiscal policy ‒ increased government spending to counteract the slump in 
output ‒ did the economy begin to gradually recover. 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 is another case in point. Despite the lessons learned from 
previous crises, most academics and policy makers seemed surprised by the causes of the global 
financial crisis, the channels by which it got transmitted throughout the economy, and the necessary 
responses by monetary and fiscal policy makers to stop it from spreading even further. The 
shortcomings of orthodox models to fully capture such phenomena have sparked interest in many 
strands of the literature that try to address the limitations of our current understanding. Two such 
areas have been of particular interest. The first area relates to the limits of monetary policy in the 
current environment, and how to overcome such limits. The second area focuses on the institutional 
setting of the economy, and tries to identify the role of important economic agents such as financial 
institutions in the generation and propagation of shocks.  
As for monetary policy, the central banks of many countries have lowered their respective policy 
rate to values close to zero. The zero lower bound of the interest rate creates an obstacle for 
monetary policy makers who intend to stimulate the economy even further. In many countries, 
central banks have relied on quantitative easing measures, i.e. the attempt to reduce longer-term 
interest rates, in order to deliver the desired additional stimulus. Some questions of interest are 
whether the purchase of long-term bonds has similar effects as traditional policy instruments, 
whether fiscal multipliers are different in the presence of a zero lower bound, whether central banks 
should pay attention to additional targets besides the traditional ones of inflation, and, in some 
cases, output, or whether inflation targets should be raised under certain circumstances in order for 
central banks to have more room to respond to shocks. At the heart of many of these questions lie 
non-linearities in certain economic variables. For example, the zero lower bound embodies such a 
non-linearity because the interest rate cannot decline below this threshold even if the economic 
situation might warrant it. Additionally, sudden unpredictable changes in these variables may 
produce discontinuities that cannot be properly captured if one relies on a smooth representation in 
one’s models. A proper understanding of such supposedly abnormal effects may pay off exactly 
when it is needed most, i.e. during crisis times or at the limits of traditional policy instruments. 
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As for the second area, financial intermediation is an essential element of modern economies. At the 
most basic level, financial intermediaries channel funds from individuals or institutions that have an 
excess of money – the savers – to those that have an immediate need for such funds – the 
borrowers. For instance, banks collect savings from depositors who seek to earn interest on the 
share of their income that they do not need for immediate consumption. Banks in turn grant loans 
to companies in order for them to undertake worthwhile investment projects that will generate 
future cash flows that allow them to pay back the loans and make a profit. In an ideal world, 
perfectly functioning financial intermediation enables an economy to generate a higher level of 
output by channeling financial resources to the users who can generate the highest benefits from 
them. 
Financial intermediaries include banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and securities firms. 
They all perform different roles in various segments of the financial market. Historically, banks used 
to be the most important intermediaries, and they are still the most significant players in many 
developing, emerging, and even advanced economies. Their main functions are to transform short-
term liabilities into long-term assets, manage and transfer risks, and provide liquidity services. The 
traditional view of banks, sketched in the above example, mainly sees them as intermediaries 
between individual savers and companies. However, during the last several decades, financial 
systems have become more complex and differentiated, especially in advanced economies like the 
United States and the United Kingdom. The reasons for this trend are manifold and include financial 
deregulation, such as the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act in the US in 1999, technological 
progress, especially in modern information and communications technologies, as well as 
globalization, mainly in the form of the reduction of trade barriers and international capital controls. 
These and other trends have enabled and promoted advances in the financial industry, among them 
innovative financial products, a global reach matching the needs of intermediaries’ multinational 
clients, as well as new funding and investment opportunities that were previously inaccessible.  
Financial institutions do not only intermediate between original savers and final borrowers, but they 
also interact among themselves. These interactions can take a variety of forms. For instance, a 
securities firm may enter into an interest-rate-swap agreement with a bank, or one bank may give a 
long-term loan to another bank. One of the most important markets in which financial institutions 
interact, though, is the money market. According to Stigum & Crescenzi (2007), the “money market 
is a wholesale market for low-risk, highly liquid, short-term IOUs”. Such debt securities mostly have a 
maturity of less than one year; frequently, they are just overnight. While there are many different 
players in the money market, banks are very important in two segments of this market: the market 
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for immediately available reserves at the respective central bank (e.g. the federal funds market in 
the US), and the repo market. In the first market, banks trade unsecured overnight funds to meet 
their reserve requirements, while in the second market, funds are collateralized. Both markets are 
instrumental for banks to manage their short-term liquidity needs which can arise from, for 
example, unexpected depositor withdrawals or sudden fluctuations in the value of a bank’s assets. 
The interest rate that banks pay and receive in the first market is a key rate for the economy, i.e. 
many other interest rates are based on it. In fact, it is so important that it is, in many countries, the 
immediate instrument of monetary policy in order to achieve certain targets for economic variables 
such as inflation, output, and long-term interest rates. Therefore, banks and the markets they act in 
are an essential part of the economy even if financial markets have become more diversified and 
differentiated. 
Despite the importance of financial intermediaries, standard macroeconomic frameworks rarely 
incorporate them explicitly, or only take a simplistic approach to modeling certain aspects of their 
role, such as deposit taking and loan making by banks (Woodford, 2010). But the nature of financial 
intermediation plays a crucial role for the functioning of the economy and the implementation of 
monetary policy. For example, a distinction is often made between bank-based and market-based 
economies. In the former, for example Germany, France, and Italy, firms mainly finance themselves 
through bank loans. In the latter, for example the United States and the United Kingdom, firms much 
more often access the capital markets through the issuance of commercial paper or corporate bonds 
that get sold directly to investors. Such structural differences have consequences for the 
transmission of monetary policy. According to Worms (2004), the pass-through of changes in the 
policy rate to other interest rates is faster in securities than in bank loan markets. As a result, the 
cost of capital for firms is thought to take more time to adjust in a bank-based system, an effect that 
needs to be taken into consideration by central bankers in their day-to-day decision-making. 
The central position of financial intermediaries in the economy also becomes apparent in times of 
crisis, when the proper functioning of the financial system is impaired. The characteristics of such 
crisis episodes can be very diverse, as the following three short examples demonstrate. First, during 
bank runs, savers withdraw their deposits from banks in large numbers. The reason for this 
phenomenon might be doubts about the solvency or liquidity of a particular institution. In a 
fractional reserve banking system, banks only need to have a certain amount of funds available to 
cover their costumers’ liquidity needs. If a bank experiences the loss of too many deposits, it will 
become illiquid. In fact, many countries have deposit insurance schemes in place that are designed 
to prevent self-fulfilling bank runs in the first place. Second, the failure of one institution can trigger 
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a cascading effect throughout the financial system, since one institution’s liabilities are often 
another one’s assets. The extent of such financial contagion is more severe the more interconnected 
the individual entities are. Measures to prevent contagion are adequate capital requirements that 
allow for a sufficient buffer against losses or government intervention if the crisis turns out to be too 
severe. Third, the financial sector can experience a systemic crisis. This can occur if liquidity in the 
banking system dries up, i.e. if it is not possible for a large number of banks to secure the short-term 
funds they require. If a large shock or a sudden negative outlook affects a considerable number of 
financial intermediaries, they may abruptly turn risk-averse, hoarding liquidity instead of distributing 
it in the market in order to guard against future potential financing needs. This may cause a shortage 
of liquidity for nearly all institutions, and may not only put them at the risk of insolvency, but also 
impair the effectiveness of monetary policy to counter the initial shock. 
A case in point for these three examples is the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. First, the British 
bank Northern Rock experienced a classic run on its deposits in September 2007. This came after it 
approached the Bank of England for liquidity support after it could not secure sufficient funding in 
the money market any more. Concerned costumers started withdrawing money, further depleting 
Northern Rock’s funds. Second, in the US, the collapse of the investment firm Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 spread rapidly through the US and international financial system: As a direct 
consequence of Lehman’s demise, the money market mutual fund Reserve Primary Fund ‘broke the 
buck’, i.e. its share price fell below $1. The insurance company AIG was bailed out by the Federal 
Reserve Bank after it could not come up with sufficient collateral after a ratings downgrade. Further 
contagion to AIG’s creditors was prevented by this and additional bailouts. Third, liquidity 
disappeared system-wide during the global financial crisis, for example causing the funding problems 
at Northern Rock to begin with. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the interbank market dried 
up completely as a source of liquidity. 
Against this backdrop, my dissertation addresses several questions about monetary policy and the 
role of financial intermediaries in the economy. What effects do non-linearities in monetary policy 
have on the economy? How important is interbank lending and borrowing for banks extending loans 
to the real economy? How does monetary policy influence this relationship? Are there differences in 
monetary transmission in the interbank markets of different countries?  
My dissertation contributes to the literature both from a theoretical and an empirical perspective. 
First, it extends the impulse matching technique to an economy with a differentiated banking sector, 
and draws comparison between two countries. Second, it uses a novel method to empirically assess 
the role of bank size for the lending behavior of financial institutions and approaches the 
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geographical dimension of monetary policy transmission. Third, it applies a recently developed 
procedure to a New Keynesian model that is subject to different types of non-linearities in the Taylor 
rule in order to assess the effects of bounds and discontinuities in monetary policy on the economy.  
The first chapter of my dissertation seeks to analyze differences in the role of the interbank market 
with respect to the United States and Germany. This is done by developing a structural model of an 
economy with a banking sector that includes an interbank market and using parameters that are 
calibrated by matching the theoretical impulse responses of the model with the empirical responses 
of a vector autoregression model for the United States and Germany, respectively. This method 
overcomes the identification problem of changes in total loan volume by distinguishing between 
supply and demand factors that simultaneously influence aggregate balance sheet data. The chapter 
finds evidence for a bank lending channel in both countries. However, there does not seem to be a 
systematic difference between the market-based economy of the United States and the bank-based 
economy of Germany. Additionally, frictions in the interbank market cause a larger decline in lending 
by small banks as compared to the case of a frictionless interbank market. The absolute impact of 
such frictions on bank lending is larger in Germany than in the United States. 
The second chapter uses the balance sheet data of US banks to determine the importance of the 
interbank market for the transmission of monetary policy. It finds evidence that the credit channel 
does not work through bank size per se, but that it has substantial effects on banks’ balance sheet 
positions depending on their size. It is important not to aggregate or net out balance sheet items 
such as securities, interbank lending and borrowing, since they have distinct effects on real sector 
lending. Additionally, there is some evidence that the credit channel has changed over time and has 
a more pronounced effect on banks operating in smaller geographic areas. 
The third chapter uses policy function iteration methods to numerically solve and analyze a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model that incorporates various non-linearities. The model includes 
firms’ marginal cost spread in the Taylor rule to directly take account of their financial situation. 
First, the effects of the zero lower bound of the interest rate are analyzed. It is shown to produce a 
kink in the policy functions. Second, the chapter models changes to the parameters in the central 
bank’s Taylor rule. This results in a discontinuity in the policy functions. Different solution techniques 
are implemented, and the accuracy of the results is compared by means of Euler equation residuals. 
The chapter highlights some of the advantages of policy function iteration over alternative methods 
with respect to modeling such non-linearities. 
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These findings are relevant for policy makers because non-linearities in monetary policy and the 
structure of financial markets have important effects on the economy in both crisis and normal 
times. A better understanding of their functioning can help policy makers reach more informed 
decisions and can mitigate the effects of unforeseen events.  
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
The Bank Lending Channel and Interbank 
Relations in the United States and Germany 
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1.1 Introduction 
Monetary policy affects the real economy through a large number of channels (for an extensive 
overview, see Worms, 2004). One way to distinguish between different types of transmission 
channels is the degree to which they rely on the existence of frictions in financial markets (Bernanke 
& Blinder, 1992). These frictions constitute a violation of the Modigliani-Miller theorem which states 
that, in an efficient market, the capital structure of a firm is irrelevant to the firm’s value (Modigliani 
& Miller, 1958). Traditional mechanisms do not need to rely on financial frictions to work. In the case 
of the interest rate channel, an increase in the monetary policy rate leads to a rise in the real 
interest rate, assuming a certain degree of price stickiness. For firms, this leads to an increase in 
their cost of capital and reduces the profitability of new investments. For households, a higher 
lending rate may result in lower borrowing and subsequently lower consumption. Hence, aggregate 
demand declines as a result of changes in both the firm and the household sectors.  
In a modern economy, different types of financial frictions can lead to a break-down of the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem. One can broadly distinguish between three different sectors where such 
financial imperfections can play out: banks, the non-bank sector comprising firms and households, 
and the private capital market. The four types of financial frictions that are most important for the 
question of how monetary policy gets transmitted to the real economy arise A) between 
firms/households and banks, B) between different banks, C) between banks and other funding 
sources, especially the private capital market, and D) between the non-bank sector and the non-
bank capital market. A vast literature exists for each of these frictions.  
This paper examines the first two types of frictions and their role for the transmission of monetary 
policy. It presents a model of an economy with two classes of banks which maximize profits by 
deciding on their supply of loans to the real sector and by interacting in the interbank market, given 
their expectations about the development of central bank policy. The notion that monetary policy 
can directly affect loan supply (type A) illustrates the working of the so-called bank lending channel, 
considered one of the most important non-traditional transmission mechanisms of monetary policy 
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). On the firm side, the prerequisite for this channel to work is a lack of 
alternative funding sources, such as from the private capital market (type D). On the bank side, loan 
supply only falls if the bank has no substitutes for reservable deposits at its disposal, for instance by 
relying on interbank lending (type B) or by issuing bank bonds in the capital market (type C; Romer & 
Romer, 1990).  
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Empirically, the bank lending channel is subject to an identification problem. Since bank balance 
sheet positions are the result of both supply and demand, it is difficult to interpret changes in such 
positions being driven by a single factor. As a consequence, the literature has developed ways to 
make use of informational asymmetries as proxied, for example, by size to identify the response of 
lending to the real sector (Kashyap & Stein, 1995). A common assumption is that informational 
asymmetries affect smaller firms or banks more strongly than their larger counterparts, so it should 
be harder for them to find alternative funds and compensate for the loss in bank loans or deposits 
(Gertler & Gilchrist, 1994).  
The two classes of banks in the model can be thought of as representing a small and a large bank 
sector that face a different degree of financial market frictions caused by these informational 
asymmetries. The model can distinguish between loan supply and demand, which is necessary for 
identifying the bank lending channel. It also models the interbank market between the two bank 
types in order to analyze how a change in frictions between banks can affect lending. It is assumed 
that the real sector cannot access any other source of funds besides loans, and that small banks do 
not have access to the private capital markets, but large banks do.  
To gain a cross-country perspective, a vector autoregression (VAR) model is estimated for both the 
United States and Germany. The impulse responses generated by the theoretical model are then 
matched with the empirical impulse responses for each country individually by means of an impulse 
matching procedure. This method permits the identification of different loan demand and loan 
supply components. The comparison of two countries can yield additional insights. Germany is 
considered to be the archetype of a bank-based economy, while the United States is regarded as a 
market-based system (Levine, 2002). Systematic differences in loan demand and loan supply 
between the two countries could lead to distinctive dynamics in economic outcomes. For example, 
the adjustment of interest rates is usually faster in securities than in bank loan markets, so the 
interest rate channel should work more slowly in a bank-based system (Worms, 2004).   
Additionally, the model sheds light on the importance of the interbank market for lending outcomes. 
If frictions exist in the way that financial institutions exchange funds, this may affect the relationship 
between them and the real sector.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the dynamic general equilibrium model that 
is used to simulate the economy. Section 1.3 generates the empirical responses of the US and the 
German economies in response to an exogenous shock in the interest rate and matches these 
responses with the theoretical model. Section 1.4 examines the evidence for a bank lending channel 
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in each economy and the role of the interbank market for lending. Lessons from comparing both 
countries are drawn. Section 1.5 concludes. 
 
 
1.2 Model 
The model consists of a banking sector with two different bank types, the central bank, and the real 
sector. It builds on Cosimano (1988) and Hülsewig, Mayer & Wollmershäuser (2006).  
 
1.2.1 Banks 
The model comprises two different types of bank, called S and L. The distinguishing criterion is that 
one type, S, can only fund itself with deposits and interbank funds and is presumably small, while the 
other type, L, can additionally access other sources such as the private capital markets. This setup 
illustrates the existence of frictions in financial markets that contradict the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem (Modigliani & Miller, 1958). The rationale behind this distinction is the observation that 
certain banks, especially small institutions such as the savings banks in Germany, rarely fund 
themselves on capital markets, but rely on the interbank market to raise cash or smooth out 
fluctuations in deposits. This interaction is mostly limited to their head institutions, in the case of 
Germany the Landesbanken. On the other hand, banks such as big commercial banks or the 
Landesbanken regularly tap into both domestic and international capital markets (Upper & Worms, 
2004; Koetter, et al., 2004). 
One feature of the model is that the small bank type has to pay a larger surcharge on interbank loans 
the more it borrows (called ‘rp’ for risk premium). However, this factor can also be interpreted as a 
cost component that increases more than proportionally with the amount of outstanding debt, such 
as expenses for monitoring the borrower or evaluating the creditworthiness of the requesting bank. 
This surcharge is asymmetric, i.e. if a small bank lends to a large bank in the interbank market, it 
receives the rate set by monetary policy without a risk premium. Hence, this method explicitly takes 
frictions in credit markets into account, with small banks suffering from larger informational 
asymmetries that they need to compensate with a higher interest rate.  
Banks give loans (Lt) to non-banks, for example households or enterprises. They receive deposits (Dt) 
which are subject to reserve requirements (Rt). Banks can also access the interbank market and 
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receive interbank loans (Bt). Only banks of type L can access the private capital market (CM
L
t). This 
variable may be interpreted as equity, which does not enter the firm’s profit function. The central 
bank’s policy tool is the nominal short-term interest rate (rMt). The model is expressed in real terms, 
so all interest rates are calculated at real rates (rrt). Banks charge the (real) loan rate rr
L
t for loans to 
non-banks. rrDt is the rate paid on deposits.  
As outlined in Appendix A in detail, the profit for a given bank i of type T at time t + j is  
ΠTit+j = rr
L
t+j*L
Ti
t+j – rr
D
t+j*D
Ti
t+j – (rr
M
t+j + rp
T
t)*B
Ti
t+j – C
Ti
t+j, T = S, L (1) 
where 
rpTt = max(0, ρ1
T/2*BTit+j) is the risk premium in the interbank market, and 
CTit+j = a
T/2*(LTit+j – L
Ti
t+j-1)
2 is the cost of adjusting the loan portfolio. 
 
Banks maximize profits with respect to L and B. ΠTit+j are profits of one bank of type T at time t + j. 
The other variables are defined accordingly.  
The risk premium rp depends on the size of interbank borrowing, scaled by the coefficient ρ1
T. Since 
large banks do not face a risk premium by definition, ρ1
L = 0 in all cases. In the baseline version of the 
model, the risk premium is set to zero for small banks as well to simulate a frictionless interbank 
market. Section 1.4 analyzes the effects that a positive risk premium on small bank interbank 
borrowing has on lending to the non-bank sector as compared to this benchmark case. 
Banks face costs of adjusting their loan portfolio, reflected in the last term of equation (1). The costs 
are assumed to be quadratic, indicating that a larger adjustment is relatively more expensive than a 
small correction. aT represents a scaling factor associated with adjusting the loan portfolio. These 
costs arise because banks need to monitor their loans and evaluate the borrowers’ risk.  
The profit maximization function for a single bank over time is characterized by 
VTit = Et ∑ β
j* ΠTit+j (2) 
with Et being the rational expectations operator based on the information set available to the bank 
at time t. β is the discount factor. The above equation shows that the bank maximizes the present 
value of all future profits. 
The balance sheet differs by bank type. For banks of type S, the constraint is 
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LSit+j + R
Si
t+j = D
Si
t+j + B
Si
t+j (3a) 
while for banks of type L, it is 
LLit+j + R
Li
t+j = D
Li
t+j + B
Li
t+j + CM
Li
t+j  (3b) 
The difference between the two types of banks is that type L can access additional sources of 
funding on the capital market, while type S cannot.  
Loan demand is given by 
LLt + L
S
t = b1*yt  – b2* rr
L
t  (4) 
The sum of both banks’ loans depends positively on the output gap and negatively on the real 
lending rate. The parameters b1 and b2 reflect the income elasticity and the interest elasticity of 
aggregate loan demand.  
Appendix A derives the optimality conditions for each banking type and calculates the loan volume 
that maximizes the bank’s profits. The loan volume aggregated over n banks for each type 
individually is  
LSt = 1/ ψ 1*β*EtL
S
t+1 + 1/ ψ 1*L
S
t-1 + b1/b2*na
S (-1)/ ψ 1*yt  
– rpt – na
 S (-1)/ ψ 1*rr
M
t – na
 S (-1)/ ψ 1/b2*L
L
t  (5) 
 
LLt = 1/ ψ 2*β*EtL
L
t+1 + 1/ ψ 2*L
L
t-1 + b1/b2*na
L (-1)/ ψ 2*yt  
– naL (-1)/ ψ 2*rr
M
t – na
L (-1)/ ψ 2/b2*L
S
t  (6) 
 
where ψ1 = (β + 1/(na
S*b2) + 1) and ψ2 = (β + 1/(na
L*b2) + 1). 
 
Banks smooth their loans over time. Loans depend negatively on the real interest rate, and they also 
depend on the other type’s loans. The reason for this interaction is that loan demand depends on 
the loan volume, so a change in loans for one bank type has repercussions through the lending rate 
on the other bank. An increase in output leads to a rise in the loan volume.  
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Equations (7) and (8) are the balance sheet constraints of the respective bank type after aggregation, 
which are derived from the profit maximization problem (see equations A.7a and A.7b in Appendix 
A): 
BSt = (d – 1)*D
S
t + L
S
t (7) 
BLt = (d – 1)*D
L
t + L
L
t – CM
L
t (8) 
where d is the required reserve ratio. In the simulation, the balance sheet variables are weighted by 
their average real value over the estimation horizon because the variables in equations (7) and (8) 
represent percentage deviations from steady state and need to be converted to absolute numbers 
to be summable. 
The interbank market has to clear: 
BSt = – B
L
t (9) 
Interbank lending from one bank type has to match interbank borrowing from the other type. This 
assumption is strict in that it does not account for interactions with a third type, such as foreign 
banks. Nevertheless, interbank lending between the types of banks examined in this paper has a 
large share of total interbank lending, especially for the savings banks in Germany (see Upper & 
Worms, 2004).   
This model of the banking sector is an extension of the Hülsewig et al. (2006) paper which assumes 
that the balance sheet constraint for a single bank always holds since a bank will unconditionally get 
the money it needs from the central bank as the lender of last resort in response to deposit shocks. 
Here, funds are intermediated by large banks if there is a shock to small bank deposits (or loans). 
And large banks demand a risk premium, so there is no free lunch for small banks. 
Rewriting equation (4) yields the real lending rate: 
rrLt = b1/b2*yt  – 1/b2*(L
L
t + L
S
t) (10) 
Since we assume a homogenous loan market, the effect of the loan volume of each bank is 
symmetrical on the real lending rate. 
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1.2.2 Central bank 
The central bank follows an interest-rate smoothing Taylor rule that takes into account the output 
gap. The weight on the output gap is usually small, but significant in some cases, so that it is included 
in the model. The central bank is forward-looking in that it takes account of inflation in the next 
period: 
rMt = δ1*r
M
t-1 + δ2*Etπt+1 + δ3*y + ηt (11a) 
The shock to the policy rate is modeled as an AR(1) process: 
ηt =  δ4*ηt  + ut (11b) 
The exogenous shock to monetary policy is reflected in the term ut. The nominal interest rate r
M
t is 
used to calculate the real interest rate and the real lending rate, as the two next identities show: 
rrMt = r
M
t – πt (12) 
rrLt = r
L
t – πt (13) 
 
1.2.3 The real economy 
The model incorporates a Phillips curve with forward-looking inflation expectations (see for example 
Gali, 2008). Inflation depends on tomorrow’s inflation as well as today’s output gap.  
πt = α1*Etπt+1 + α3*yt  (14) 
Aggregate demand follows a dynamic IS equation.  
yt = γ1*Etyt+1 + γ3*yt-1 – γ2*rr
L
t (15) 
The fact that the real lending rate affects the output gap demonstrates how the situation in the 
banking sector influences the real economy.  
Equation (16) represents a deposit supply equation. An increase in output raises the supply of bank 
deposits available to banks. An increase in the spread between the lending rate and the central bank 
interest rate reduces the supply of deposits. The reason behind this behavior is that households or 
enterprises face an increase in their borrowing costs when their lending rate goes up, or, 
alternatively, they receive a lower return on their deposits when the central bank decreases the 
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money market rate. In both cases would their ability or willingness to deposit funds with their banks 
decline.  
dst = θ3*dst-1 + θ 1*yt – θ2*(r
L
t – r
M
t) (16) 
The supply of deposits, ds, gets distributed to the two bank types according to the following 
equation: 
DTt = σ
T*dst , with T = L, S and σ
S + σL = 1      (17) 
The interaction of the real sector, as represented by households and enterprises, with the banking 
sector is modeled with ad hoc equations and is not based on an explicit profit maximizing problem in 
order to reduce the complexity of the model. The real sector is limited to demanding loans according 
to equation (4) and supplying deposits based on equation (16).  
In the next section, a VAR model is estimated for both the United States and Germany. The impulse 
responses generated by this model are then matched with the impulses that result from an interest 
rate shock to the theoretical model outlined in this section. 
 
 
1.3 VAR models and impulse matching 
Similar approaches of estimating VARs including aggregate bank balance sheet variables have been 
pursued by Garretsen & Swank (1998), Küppers (2001), Morsink & Bayoumi (2001), Kakes & Sturm 
(2002), Holtemöller (2003), and Papadamou & Siriopoulos (2010), among others. Impulse matching 
has been performed by, for example, Rotemberg & Woodford (1998), Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
& Linde (2005), Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Evans (2005), Hülsewig, Mayer, & Wollmershäuser 
(2006), Meier & Müller (2006), and Henzel, Hülsewig, Mayer, & Wollmershäuser (2009). 
 
1.3.1 VAR models of the United States and Germany 
The VAR model takes the form 
Zt = A(L)Zt-1 + B(L)Xt-1 + µ + εt  (18) 
The vector Zt  comprises the seven endogenous variables  
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Zt  =  (GDPt, CPIt, r
M
t, D
S
t, L
L
t, L
S
t, r
L
t)’. 
GDP stands for real output proxied by industrial production, CPI for the price level, rM for the central 
bank rate, DS, LL and LS for deposits of banks of type S, lending of banks of type L, and lending of 
banks of type S, respectively, as well as the lending rate rL. The interest rates are expressed in 
decimals, while the remaining variables are calculated as log levels. The model is estimated in levels 
which takes account of cointegration relationships between the variables.  
The ordering of the VAR implies that the central bank takes current output and prices as given in 
setting the interest rate, while its decision affects the balance sheet variables and the lending rate in 
the same period (Hülsewig, Mayer, & Wollmershäuser, 2006).  
The exogenous variables in vector Xt comprise a time trend, monthly dummies, dummies for the 
introduction of the euro and a change in the definition of the lending rate, as well as a forward 
interest rate. Brissimis & Magginas (2006) have shown that the inclusion of such a forward rate helps 
to solve or mitigate the price puzzle. This puzzle, a counter-theoretical positive response of the price 
level to innovations in the interest rate, is a phenomenon that is often found in this strand of 
literature (Sims, 1992). One plausible explanation for this paradox is that the central bank has 
superior information about the economy as compared to the informational content of the variables 
in the VAR, and will react to signs of inflation at an early stage. If the model does not properly 
account for this information set, it will seem that prices increase in response to monetary tightening. 
Additionally, with a forward rate included, the monetary policy shock dies out very quickly, which 
solves the policy innovation paradox (Brissimis & Magginas, 2006, p. 1231). The rationale for 
including such a financial market instrument is that it reflects expectations about short-term 
economic developments that monetary policy takes into account (Brissimis & Magginas, 2006, p. 
1228). The data are described in more detail in Appendix B. 
Impulse responses are generated for the United States as well as for Germany. The time period is 
1991M1 to 2007M12. The decision to start the sample in 1991 is based on the fundamental changes 
in the German economy and banking sector due to reunification. The end of the sample roughly 
coincides with the onset of the financial crisis. Since the banking sector was massively supported by 
governments in the wake of the financial melt-down, the dynamics of borrowing and lending might 
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have changed, so the most recent observations are discarded. The same time period is used for the 
United States and Germany. The response horizon is 60 months.1 
The impulse responses are shown in Section 1.3.2, along with the simulated responses based on the 
impulse matching procedure described in the next section. The thin lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals based on a bootstrap procedure with 2000 replications.2 In the US (Figure 1.1), 
real output falls and returns to its equilibrium after about four years. The consumer price index 
increases slightly, which is a sign that the price puzzle has not been solved completely, but it is 
considerably mitigated in contrast to a model that excludes the forward rate. Another effect of this 
variable is that both the policy rate and the lending rate decline quickly after the shock. Deposits of 
small banks spike initially, but then turn negative and return to their equilibrium after about four 
years. Lending of both large and small banks to non-banks declines and returns to equilibrium after 
about five to six years.  
In Germany (Figure 1.2), output initially spikes and fluctuates during the first year. The price level 
initially drops, but then bounces back and only declines slowly. The impulse response is never 
statistically significant, but the price puzzle is nevertheless not completely solved. Deposits drop and 
are back at their equilibrium after about three years. Lending to non-banks by the Landesbanken and 
the savings banks follows a roughly U-shaped pattern. This result contradicts Kakes & Sturm (2002) 
who find a counter-intuitive increase in lending of the savings banks. The response of the policy rate 
fades quickly, while the lending rate shows a more extended decline and the overall magnitude is 
much smaller.  
In a cross-country comparison, the development of the policy rate, the lending of the large bank 
type and the price index seem fairly similar. Deposits react a bit more in the United States and are 
positive initially, while the response is smaller for Germany, and the initial spike is absent. Industrial 
production seems more reasonable in the US since there are no strong fluctuations. Lending of small 
banks reacts about twice as much in the US as in Germany, indicating that an interest rate shock has 
a larger impact on small US banks than on the savings bank sector in Germany. The lending rate 
seems to be more linked to interest rate policy in the case of the Federal Reserve than in the case of 
the Bundesbank/European Central Bank (ECB). One possibility is that the German lending rate is 
disconnected to a certain degree from developments in the money market because the ECB sets the 
interest rate taking into account the economic situation of the whole Euro Area and not only 
Germany. 
                                                          
1
 The total number of periods estimated is 120, which is useful for the impulse matching procedure in the next 
section. 
2
 Parts of the Matlab code from James LeSage’s toolbox were used: www.spatial-econometrics.com. 
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In the next section, an impulse matching procedure is used to find values of the model parameters 
that are consistent with the empirical impulse responses generated in this section.  
 
1.3.2 Matching impulse responses 
The basic idea of the matching impulse response methodology is to approximate the empirical 
impulse responses generated from the VARs by the theoretical responses predicted by the model 
outlined in Section 1.2. This is achieved by determining the optimal values for certain model 
parameters. These optimal parameters are chosen so that they minimize the distance between the 
theoretical and the empirical impulses, weighted by the inverse of the sample variances of the 
empirical impulses responses. 
 
Figure 1.1. Empirical and theoretical impulse responses for the United States 
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Figure 1.1 continued 
 
 
Note: The bold lines are empirical impulses. The bold line with symbols depicts theoretical impulses. The thin 
lines represent the 90% error bounds. The time axis is in months.  Note the different scales of the y-axis. 
 
Mathematically, 
  ̂  (       ) (19) 
where  ̂ are the empirical impulse responses,   are the theoretical responses,  1 is a vector of 
estimated parameters, and  2 is a vector of calibrated parameters.  
Several choices have to be made. The first question is which impulse responses to include in the 
matching. Hall, Inoue, Nason, & Rossi (2008) suggest several information criteria that help with the 
decision about which impulse response functions (IRFs) are valid and give efficient estimates. 
However, their approach starts from the universe of all possible IRFs and selects those that fulfil 
their criteria. Since this paper is empirically guided as to which IRFs are of interest, i.e. the response 
of the variables to a shock in the policy rate, these criteria are not implemented in this paper. 
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The choice of whether parameters are to be calibrated or estimated is somewhat arbitrary. Henzel, 
Hülsewig, Mayer, & Wollmershäuser (2009) suggest distinguishing calibrated from estimated 
parameters by their role for the dynamics of the economy. They calibrate the parameters which 
relate to the evolution of the flexible price equilibrium of their economy, but estimate parameters 
that reflect inefficiencies resulting from real rigidities, nominal frictions, the cost channel, and the 
policy response.  
In this paper, an ad hoc approach is chosen as to which parameters are estimated. Those parameters 
are calibrated for which the optimization routine has difficulties finding a stable solution. Table 1.1 
lists the parameters that are calibrated and their values. The estimated parameters and their 
standard errors are shown in Table 1.2. 
 
Table 1.1. Calibrated parameters  
Parameter Symbol                Calibration 
Discount factor β 0.99  
Long-run weight on inflation in Taylor rule δ2 2.00  
Weight on future inflation in Phillips curve α1 0.25  
Weight on future output in IS equation γ1 -0.50  
Risk premium coefficient in baseline version ρ1 0.00  
Share of deposits for bank type S, L σ
S
, σ
L
 0.50  
Reserve ratio d 0.10  
 
The estimator of  1 minimizes the following distance function (Henzel, Hülsewig, Mayer, & 
Wollmershäuser, 2009; Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Evans, 2005):  
         ( ̂   (  ))
 
     ( ̂   (  )) (20) 
where V is the weighting matrix, calculated as the inverse of the sample variances of the empirical 
impulse responses. Applying these weights gives point estimates with a smaller variance a higher 
weight. As Henzel, Hülsewig, Mayer, & Wollmershäuser (2009) note, an efficient estimate of  1 
would require the use of the complete variance-covariance matrix. However, the optimization 
routine seems to run into convergence problems in this case. 
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If  1 is normally distributed, then J is χ
2–distributed with N – m  degrees of freedom, where N is the 
number of observations on the impulse responses and m is the number of coefficients (Hülsewig, 
Mayer, & Wollmershäuser, 2006).  
The figures in this section show the estimated impulse responses from Section 1.3.1 and the 
matched simulated responses for the United States (Figure 1.1) and Germany (Figure 1.2). In the 
case of the US, the match between the simulated and estimated impulses for GDP is quite close. 
Only the first simulation episode lies outside the 90% confidence interval. Unfortunately, the fit is 
worse for the consumer price index. The reason is that the theoretical model is not well suited to 
accommodate the price puzzle that is still existent, if abated, in the impulse reponses coming from 
the VAR model. The simulation results show only a tiny increase in the CPI level, while the empirical 
reality is more volatile. The fit of large bank lending and deposits is quite good, with all periods 
inside the confidence band. The simulated results for small bank lending decrease faster than the 
empirical responses, so three observations lie outside the confidence interval. The confidence bands 
for the policy and the lending rates are very small, but the simulations lie within the borders in all 
but one case. 
 
Figure 1.2. Empirical and theoretical impulse responses for Germany 
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Figure 1.2 continued 
 
 
 
Note: The bold lines are empirical impulses. The bold line with symbols depicts theoretical impulses. The thin 
lines represent the 90% error bounds. The time axis is in months. Note the different scales of the y-axis. 
 
In the case of Germany (Figure 1.2), it is hard for the routine to match the empirical impulse 
response for industrial production due to its volatile nature. The simulation predicts a slight decline 
in this variable that lies mostly within the confidence bands. The simulation of the consumer price 
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index ignores the swings in the first year, and predicts a slight overall increase in prices, similar to 
the case of the United States. Lending matches very well both for small and large banks, while the 
difference in deposits is only large during the first half year. The lending rate shows a tight fit, while 
the central bank rate declines a bit too quickly. 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors are listed in the following table. The standard errors 
are calculated using the delta function method. This is necessary since the empirical impulse 
responses that are used in the matching procedure are associated with uncertainty which needs to 
be taken into account (Henzel, Hülsewig, Mayer, & Wollmershäuser, 2009).3   
 
Table 1.2. Parameter estimates for the United States and Germany 
Parameter      Estimate US Standard error Estimate Germany Standard error 
b1 4.4784 1.5430 10.000 4.2430 
b2 0.0010 0.3419 4.2827 0.3032 
na
S(-1)
 0.9525 0.4040 0.0542 0.0239 
na
L(-1)
 0.3861 0.7833 0.0767 0.1189 
δ1 0.3814 0.0902 0.8677 0.0875 
δ3 0.0000 0.0090 0.2581 0.0821 
δ4 0.5481 0.1562 0.3079 0.0461 
α3 -0.0018 0.0021 -0.0447 0.1080 
γ2 1.1717 1.5423 1.1269 0.0863 
γ3 1.4171 0.0267 1.1512 0.0519 
θ1 0.4821 0.0857 1.0000 0.1544 
θ2 2.0114 1.1412 0.0000 0.1991 
θ3 0.6835 0.1181 0.6384 0.1916 
Note: The value of the distance function is 224.9 with a probablity of 0.9999 for the US and 125.3 with a 
probability of 0.9999 for Germany. The standard errors are calculated based on the delta function 
method. In the optimization routine, the upper boundaries of the estimated parameters are set to ub = 
(10; 10; 5; 5; 1; 1; 1; 1; 3; 2; 1; 5; 1), and the lower boundaries are set to lb = (0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; -1; 0; 0; 0; 
0; 0).   
 
For the US, the low value for b2, the interest elasticity of aggregate loan demand, is striking. There is 
zero weight on the coefficient on output in the Taylor rule, δ3. The fact that the coefficient α3 is 
                                                          
3
 Parts of Matlab code on Lawrence Christiano’s web site were used, based on Altig, et al., 2005. 
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negative reflects the existence of the price puzzle. However, the coefficient is not statistically 
significant. 
In Germany, some coefficients reach the upper or lower boundaries set in the estimation procedure. 
The coefficient of the interest elasticity of aggregate loan demand, b1, is quite large at 10. θ1 and θ2 
are restricted by their boundaries as well, indicating some potential issues with the deposit supply 
function. The price puzzle coefficient is not statistically significant.  
 
 
1.4 Results 
Based on the results of the matching procedure, bank lending can be decomposed into the factors 
that affect loan supply and those that determine loan demand. Aggregate loan supply is given by 
equation A.9 in Appendix A. It consists of the previous period’s supply and the sums of the net 
present value of the discounted credit margins for each type. Loan demand depends on output and 
the real lending rate. 
The results correspond qualitatively to the findings of Hülsewig, Mayer & Wollmershäuser (2006). 
Figure 1.3 shows that, in the US, both supply (a) and demand factors (b) have an important influence 
on the loan volume. The credit margin plays a substantial initial role but fades quickly, while demand 
components work with a larger lag. Surprisingly, the lending rate seems to have no effect on loan 
demand. Hence, the simulated loan volume and the output component coincide. This result is due to 
the low interest rate elasticity coefficient b2.  
Similar conclusions hold for Germany (c and d). The credit margin has a considerable early effect. 
The lending rate component of demand is smaller than in the case of Hülsewig, Mayer & 
Wollmershäuser (2006), but larger than in the United States.  
In a cross-country comparison, it seems difficult to establish systematic differences between the two 
economies. Loan supply has similar effects, and the interest-rate channel in the United States is 
obscured by the low interest rate elasticity. 
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Figure 1.3. Loan volume decomposed in supply and demand factors 
 
 (a) Loan supply components US (b) Loan demand components US 
 
 (c) Loan supply components Germany (d) Loan demand components Germany 
Note: The thin lines show the simulated response of lending to an interest rate shock. The time axis is in 
months. 
 
The model permits an insight into the effect of interbank frictions on the lending behavior of banks. 
For this purpose, the model is simulated using the coefficient values from the matching procedure, 
but with different values for the risk premium parameter ρ1. This risk premium may represent higher 
riskiness of larger loans, or the higher administrative costs associated with such loans. Under the 
riskiness interpretation, the rationale for having a risk premium coefficient of zero in the benchmark 
model may come from the observation that during normal times, interbank loans are considered 
relatively riskless, depending on a variety of characteristics such as their maturity or collateral. 
Especially in the case of Germany, the Landesbanken as the head institutions of the savings sector 
have an interest in the smooth functioning of interbank lending. The savings banks rely on the 
The Bank Lending Channel and Interbank Relations in the United States and Germany 27 
Landesbanken as their nearly sole provider of funds besides deposits, so the incentives of charging a 
higher interest rate are relatively low. If a savings bank gets into trouble, it tends to be merged with 
other banks rather than priced out of the market (Koetter, Bos, Heid, Kolari, Kool, & Porath, 2007). 
Four different values of the risk premium coefficient are imposed. The effects of this change are not 
large, but noticeable. Looking at the impact at the trough might be of special interest to 
policymakers since it reflects the worst outcome of the shock. At the trough, the difference of small 
bank loans between a value of ρ1 = 1 and the benchmark case of ρ1 = 0 is about 4% in the case of the 
US, and 15% for Germany. Hence, interbank frictions do have a negative influence on the lending 
behavior of small banks, with German banks being comparatively more affected than US institutions 
if measured at the nadir. Although this difference of about 2 to 3 basis points is relatively small in 
economic terms, it still reflects a considerable difference in total lending of small banks, calculated 
back-of-the-envelope, of about $54 million in the US and about €194 million in Germany, measured 
in 2005 dollars and euros, respectively. The two reasons for this disparity are the smaller difference 
due to interbank frictions in the US, and the larger size of the small bank sector in Germany.  
 
Figure 1.4. Impulse responses of small bank lending in response to a shock to the policy rate under different 
scenarios for the risk premium parameter 
 
 (a) United States (b) Germany 
Note: Different scales on the y-axes  
 
These results are qualitatively in agreement with those of Worms (2003) and Ehrmann & Worms 
(2001) who find evidence for a credit channel in Germany. However, they show that small banks use 
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interbank funds to shield their costumers from a policy shock, reducing the extent of this 
transmission channel. A theoretical approach by Freixas & Jorge (2008) that models the relationship 
between banks in greater detail finds that interbank market imperfections can have an effect on 
lending behavior. 
Consistent with this line of research, this paper has shown that, as it becomes more costly for small 
banks to obtain interbank deposits, their capacity to counteract the policy-induced fall in loan supply 
is reduced. This effect is smaller in the case of the United States, which provides some evidence that 
interbank relations play a more modest role for the bank lending channel as compared to Germany. 
 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
This paper has presented a structural model of the economy with a banking sector that included an 
interbank market. Banks are profit-maximizing in their decision to lend to the real economy and tap 
into the interbank market. The parameters of the model were calibrated by matching the theoretical 
impulse responses of the model with the empirical responses of a VAR model for the United States 
and Germany, respectively. This method overcomes the identification problem of changes in total 
loan volume by distinguishing between supply and demand factors that simultaneously influence 
aggregate balance sheet data. 
The paper finds evidence for a bank lending channel in both countries. Loan supply drops quickly 
after an interest rate shock because of the expected decrease in the credit margin, while the 
reduction in loan demand is more protracted. However, there does not seem to be a systematic 
difference between the market-based economy of the United States and the bank-based economy 
of Germany. Additionally, frictions in the interbank market cause a larger decline in lending by small 
banks as compared to the case of a frictionless interbank market. The absolute impact of such 
frictions on bank lending is larger in Germany than in the United States.  
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Appendix A. A model of the banking sector 
The basic model outline follows Hülsewig et al. (2006), but there are a few twists.  
The profit maximization problem of a bank of type T is (i stands for an individual bank, t is time): 
ΠTit+j = rr
L
t+j*L
Ti
t+j – rr
M
t+j*D
Ti
t+j  
            – (rrMt+j + max(0, ρ1
T/2*BTit+j))*B
Ti
t+j – a
T/2*(LTit+j – L
Ti
t+j-1)
2   (A.1) 
s.t. LSit+j + R
Si
t+j = D
Si
t+j + B
Si
t+j if T = S or  (A.2) 
s.t. LLit+j + R
Li
t+j = D
Li
t+j + B
Li
t+j + CM
Li
t+j if T = L  (A.3) 
and  RTit+j = d* D
Ti
t+j , where R
T are reserves and d is the required reserve ratio. 
CTit+j = a
T/2*(LTit+j – L
Ti
t+j-1)
2 is the cost of adjusting the loan portfolio. 
 
ΠTit+j  is profits of one bank of type T at time t + j. 
The deposit rate rrDt is set to rr
M
t for arbitrage reasons. 
A single bank seeks to maximize the expected present value of its profit flow: 
VTit = Et ∑ β
j* ΠTit+j   (A.4) 
 
So, the objective function is max VTit with respect to L
Ti
t, B
Ti
t. Deriving the optimality conditions 
yields: 
∂VTit/∂L
Ti
t     =  rr
L
t+j – a
T*(LTit+j – L
Ti
t+j-1)  
     + aT*β *Et+j (L
Ti
t+j+1 – L
Ti
t+j) + λ
Ti
t = 0  (A.5) 
∂VTit/∂B
Ti
t    =  – rr
M
t+j – max(0, ρ1
T * BTit+j) – λ
Ti
t  = 0 (A.6) 
∂VSit/∂λ
Si
t      =  L
Si
t+j + (d – 1)*D
Si
t+j – B
Si
t+j  = 0  if T = S  or (A.7a) 
∂VLit/∂λ
Li
t     =  L
Li
t+j + (d – 1)*D
Li
t+j – B
Li
t+j  + CM
Li
t+j  = 0  if T = L (A.7b) 
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From A.5 and A.6 follows the optimal loan supply for a bank of type T: 
rrLt+j – a
T*(LTit+j – L
Ti
t+j-1) + a
T*β * Et+j (L
Ti
t+j+1 – L
Ti
t+j) – rr
M
t+j  
–  max(0, ρ1
T * BTit+j) = 0 (A.8) 
 
Optimal loan supply depends on the spread between the lending and the policy rate, the marginal 
cost of changing the loan portfolio, and a factor related to the risk premium in the interbank market. 
Aggregate loan supply (evaluated at j = 0) is the sum of loans of n identical banks of each type: 
          
  (  ) ∑         (    
      
 )      (  ) ∑         (    
      
 )   (A.9) 
 
Hülsewig et al. (2006) show how to derive the loan market equilibrium from equation (A.9). There is 
a small change compared to their paper, since there are two bank types in the model here. Hence, 
the loan demand equation is given by 
LLt + L
S
t = b1*yt  – b2*rr
L
t  (A.10) 
 
Following the steps in Hülsewig et al. (2006) yields the final equations: 
 
LSt = 1/ ψ 1*β*EtL
S
t+1 + 1/ ψ 1*L
S
t-1 + b1/b2*na
S (-1)/ ψ 1*yt  
         – rpt – na
 S (-1)/ ψ 1*rr
M
t – na
 S (-1)/ ψ 1/b2*L
L
t (A.11) 
LLt = 1/ ψ 2*β*EtL
L
t+1 + 1/ ψ 2*L
L
t-1 + b1/b2*na
L (-1)/ ψ 2*yt  
         – naL (-1)/ ψ 2*rr
M
t – na
L (-1)/ ψ 2/b2*L
S
t (A.12) 
 
 
Appendix B. Data 
For Germany, industrial production, the CPI index, and the money market rate are taken from the 
IMF IFS. Data on German banks are available from the Bundesbank website. The following series 
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have been used: Lending to non-banks (non-MFIs) by savings banks (OU1083), lending to non-banks 
(non-MFIs) by Landesbanken (OU1033), deposits and borrowing from domestic non-banks (non-
MFIs) of savings banks (OU1842). Ideally, one would want to exploit micro data to calculate 
aggregate balance sheet positions of the small and large bank sectors for all banks in Germany. 
Unfortunately, such data are not publicly available. Using data for the Landesbanken and savings 
banks can nevertheless be considered a valid approximation since decision-making is relatively 
autonomous and independent in these institutions. However, one should keep possible limitations in 
mind.  
Bank balance sheet data and the industrial production index are all in log-levels. Bank data have 
been deflated using the CPI index. Interest rates are in decimals. The monetary instrument is the 
overnight market rate in Frankfurt. Potential breaks due to the introduction of the euro and the 
switch in lending rates in June 2003 are captured by dummy variables. It is perceivable that only 
including a dummy variable at the break in the lending series might not sufficiently capture the 
change in its definition. However, one has to weigh the loss of several years of data against the risk 
of inappropriately putting the two series together. Since it can be assumed that the new definition of 
the lending variable is highly correlated with the counterfactual of the old definition, adding more 
than 50 observations might be worthwhile. The lending rate is calculated as the average of the 
effective interest rates of German banks / Outstanding amounts / Housing loans to households with 
maturity of over 1 year and up to 5 years (SUD007), as well as the corresponding rates for consumer 
credit and other loans to households (SUD010) and loans to non-financial corporations (SUD013).  
The two-month forward rate one-month ahead, fr, is calculated based on Gurkaynak, Sack, & Wright 
(2006, p. 6): 
frt(1, 2) = (3 * r
M
3m, t – r
M
1m, t  ) / 2 (B.1) 
where rM3mt and r
M
1mt are the money market rates in Frankfurt for three-month and one-month 
contracts, respectively. The data, series ECWGM3M and ECWGM1M, are downloaded from 
Datastream.  
For the US, data on banks are retrieved from the Federal Reserve. The series used are deposits, small 
domestically chartered commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted (H8/H8/B1058NSMDM), 
commercial and industrial loans, small domestically chartered commercial banks, not seasonally 
adjusted (H8/H8/B1023NSMDM), and commercial and industrial loans, large domestically chartered 
commercial banks, not seasonally adjusted (H8/H8/B1023NLGDM).  
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Industrial production, the CPI index, the Fed funds rate, and the lending rate are downloaded from 
the IMF IFS. The one-month forward rate one-month ahead is created similarly as for Germany. The 
difference is due to data availability, but should not have a large influence on the final results. The 
data used, obtained from Datastream, are the US interbank offered rate for one-month and two-
month funds, respectively (BBUSD1M, BBUSD2M).  
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2.1 Introduction 
Monetary policy affects the real economy in a variety of ways. The transmission mechanism which is 
best understood, and commonly thought to have the strongest effect, is the so-called interest rate 
channel. This concept holds that, in the presence of price rigidities, an increase in the policy rate will 
raise the real interest rate, reducing investment by firms and credit-related consumption by 
households, eventually weakening aggregate demand. Additionally, the rate increase will put 
upward pressure on the exchange rate which will make exports more, but imports less, expensive. 
Restrictive monetary policy also tends to depress asset prices, which in turn reduces aggregate 
demand (Worms, 2004).  
The transmission channels described above function independently of frictions in financial markets: 
they operate even if these markets are perfect. The literature refers to them as traditional 
transmission channels (Bernanke, 1983; Bernanke & Blinder, 1992). In this view, financial institutions 
are treated as a black box, seen as merely passing on interest rates and reacting to aggregate 
demand-induced changes in loan volume, but with no distinct economic significance for 
macroeconomic variables such as output and inflation. However, the research of Ben Bernanke and 
others (e.g. Bernanke & Blinder, 1992; Kashyap, Stein, & Wilcox, 1993; Bernanke & Gertler, 1995; 
Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1999) has highlighted the importance of banks’ idiosyncratic supply 
decisions in providing credit to their clients and has created theories of the credit channel which 
accord the financial sector a more active role in the transmission of monetary policy.  
For the credit channel to operate, financial markets need to be subject to imperfections (commonly 
considered to be the result of informational asymmetries). For instance, in the balance sheet 
channel, a sub-mechanism of the credit channel, a potential borrower’s ability to obtain funds 
depends on the amount of his net worth that can be used to finance projects internally or as 
collateral for loans. However, due to informational asymmetries, external finance is subject to 
agency costs that lead to a markup of external over internal finance, the so-called external finance 
premium. Therefore, an increase in interest rates will tend to decrease an individual’s net worth 
because of higher interest payments on debt and a diminished value of collateral, which in turn will 
raise the amount of external finance that an individual would need and thereby the external finance 
premium. Hence, the borrower will be able to acquire fewer external funds due to loan supply 
restrictions, which reduces aggregate demand. 
The focus of this paper is the bank lending channel, another sub-channel of the credit channel, in 
which informational asymmetries also play an essential role. In this channel, monetary policy 
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influences bank lending by manipulating the aggregate amount of required reserves, affecting the 
credit available through the banking system. Under a restrictive monetary policy, the central bank 
decreases the amount of required reserves, which results in a reduction of deposits that banks can 
accept in order to meet their reserve requirements. When deposits decline, banks may be compelled 
to reduce their supply of loans, negatively affecting aggregate demand. Unlike the traditional 
transmission channels, for this channel to be operative, two conditions that are related to market 
frictions are necessary. First, deposits and other funding sources, such as certificates of deposit or 
commercial paper, must be imperfect substitutes for one another (Fama, 1985; Romer & Romer, 
1990). This might be the case when there are high transaction costs for such instruments. Second, 
bank loans and other bank assets such as securities holdings must also be imperfect substitutes for 
one another, which is a reasonable assumption given their distinct risk diversification and liquidity 
characteristics (Worms, 2004). If these instruments were perfect substitutes, a bank could simply 
draw down its holdings of such alternative assets instead of its loan portfolio. If these two conditions 
are met, a decline in deposits cannot be fully compensated for by other means and a bank must 
adjust its lending portfolio by decreasing the availability of loans.  
Bank lending channel literature postulates that such market imperfections should affect some types 
of banks more than others. Most importantly, small banks are thought to be particularly susceptible 
to market imperfections, as they have fewer financing and investment options at their disposal than 
large banks. As such, one would expect that, ceteris paribus, smaller financial institutions should be 
less able to shelter their lending portfolio from shocks.  
However, small banks may have developed strategies to circumvent such ‘shortcomings’. For 
instance, literature on relationship banking emphasizes the frequently close, even personal, long-
term ties most prevalent between small banks and their customers (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 2004). 
Small banks are at an advantage in this regard because they are located in closer geographic 
proximity to their clients and may therefore have access to more ‘soft’ information than large banks 
that rely on standardized methods and ‘hard’ facts, such as credit scores, to determine whether to 
approve a loan (Petersen, 2004). Such a close, long-term relationship brings with it the need for a 
small bank to shelter its borrowers if shocks put pressure on their balance sheets (Deutsche 
Bundesbank, 2001; Worms, 2003). It is conceivable that these banks adjust their balance sheets in 
ways that allow them to respond adequately to such situations (Worms, 2004). One would therefore 
expect that the bank lending channel does not necessarily manifest itself as a direct size-dependence 
of lending, but as different adjustments of balance sheet positions for banks of different sizes.  
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In contrast to this position, studies on the US banking system generally find support for a direct size 
dependence in the credit channel (e.g. Kashyap & Stein, 1995; Kashyap & Stein, 2000; Peek & 
Rosengren, 1995), though there are exceptions (Den Haan, Sumner & Yamashiro, 2007). Studies on 
Europe, however, are more mixed (deBondt, 1999; Favero, Giavazzi & Flabbi, 1999; Gambacorta, 
2005). 
One underexplored aspect of the financial sector’s role in the functioning of the credit channel is the 
relationship between banks in the interbank market. In the literature, interbank variables are 
frequently mixed with other balance sheet positions to form measures of bank liquidity (e.g. 
Kashyap & Stein, 2000; Gambacorta, 2005), if they are included at all (e.g. Kashyap & Stein, 1995). 
This is surprising since it seems essential to control for changes in the precise composition of banks’ 
balance sheets when identifying the differential effects of various transmission channels. For 
example, imagine a very simple bank with only loans as assets and both capital and deposits as 
liabilities. A negative exogenous shock to capital would force the bank to restrict lending if it cannot 
attract more deposits. In this case, the capital-asset ratio would decline, while the deposit ratio 
would increase, and lending growth would be negative. If one neglected the capital-asset ratio in a 
regression, it would appear that lower lending growth was associated with a higher deposit ratio. 
Therefore, most regressions either include the capital-asset ratio (Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2004) or 
divide banks up into groups based on this ratio before running a regression (Kishan & Opiela, 2000). 
This paper argues that such an omitted variable bias could likewise exist if a regression did not 
properly account for interbank lending and borrowing.  
One reason that interbank positions might get overlooked is that they typically comprise only a small 
share of total bank assets, especially when compared to other balance sheet items like loans or 
deposits (see Section 2.3 below). Nevertheless, interbank activities perform valuable functions for 
banks, both as lenders and borrowers, and should not be treated as rounding errors. First, interbank 
lending can be a profit center, especially for small banks (Stigum & Crescenzi, 2007). Additionally, it 
can provide some buffer against shocks, similar to cash or security holdings (Stein, 1998). Further, 
banks may benefit from a relatively cheap and reliable funding alternative, especially when they are 
able to develop relationships with other banks (Furfine, 1999; Cocco, Gomes & Martins, 2009). 
Hence, it is vital to distinguish different balance sheet positions in order to determine their 
respective importance for the bank lending channel. Based on the above discussion, one may 
hypothesize that interbank lending is more important for small than for large banks. Also, interbank 
borrowing and lending are no substitutes since they may fulfill distinct functions for different banks 
and therefore cannot be netted out. 
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These questions are of great relevance since an accurate understanding of the transmission channels 
of monetary policy is essential for central banks to set an adequate policy rate. Moreover, banks’ 
behavior in the interbank market may give policy makers valuable information about the effects of 
their measures, so that they can make necessary adjustments. Also, the credit channel may operate 
differently if it relies directly on bank size as opposed to a scenario in which the balance sheet 
composition, rather than its magnitude, matters for the transmission of monetary policy.   
There are relatively few papers that pay attention to the specific influence of the interbank market 
on the credit channel. Freixas & Jorge (2008) develops a theoretical model of how financial 
imperfections in the interbank market affect the transmission of monetary policy. The authors find 
support for Kashyap & Stein’s (2000) liquidity effect which provides that less liquid banks react more 
strongly to monetary policy changes, as well as for credit rationing. The latter can occur when banks, 
after a raise in the monetary policy rate, are unable to secure sufficient funding in the interbank 
market and therefore decrease lending to the real economy rather than pass on the higher lending 
rate to their clients. Worms (2001, 2003) and Ehrmann & Worms (2001, 2004) provide evidence for 
the existence of the credit channel in Germany, taking into account the specific network structure of 
the German banking sector.  
Literature dealing with financial crises has often focused on the interbank market, particularly on 
how liquidity shortages can spread through the interbank market during such times (Allen & Gale, 
2000; Upper & Worms, 2004; Mistrulli, 2011). However, this paper emphasizes that the interbank 
market should be considered essential for having effects on the real economy even during ‘normal’ 
times. Hence, this paper focuses on the last 20 years and encompasses both good and bad times. 
Additionally, one of the robustness checks in this paper is to exclude observations during the recent 
financial crisis. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the estimation methodology. Section 2.3 
describes the data and presents more detailed information on the US interbank market. Section 2.4 
reports the results and interprets the findings in light of the hypotheses described above. Section 2.5 
concludes. 
 
 
 
 
The US Interbank Market, Bank Size, and the Credit Channel 40 
2.2 Model 
The model represents a reduced form of the loan market in the spirit of Kashyap & Stein (1995) and 
Ehrmann et al. (2003). It includes interaction terms for both the size dependency of the balance 
sheet variables and their dependency on monetary policy.  
 
(           )
      
                  (               )             (                )
   (            )    (                      )                                                           
                (                     )                    
 
The dependent variable C (for credit) is quarter-on-quarter growth in total bank lending, as defined 
in the next section. The term b stands for the bank balance sheet variables of interest. Size 
represents the logarithm of total bank assets. The term i reflects the interest rate or an alternative 
monetary policy indicator. Bcon is a term for other bank control variables, such as idiosyncratic risk. 
X stands for non-bank control variables. A full set of time dummies is captured by dt.  
The term ∆it-1*sizen,t-1 is of special interest. It reflects the credit channel, interpreted as a direct size 
dependence of interest rate changes: as explained earlier, a restrictive monetary policy should have 
a smaller (less negative) effect on lending growth for a larger than for a smaller bank. Hence, if this 
form of the credit channel exists,   should be positive and significant. 
All regressions are based on the fixed-effects model. The standard errors are assumed to be cluster-
robust, that is, errors are independent across banks, but allow for intra-cluster (within bank) 
correlation, for N →  . In other words, observations are independent across banks, but they need 
not be independent within banks. This is a weaker assumption than the errors      being i.i.d.  
A complete set of time dummies dt is included in all regressions. The advantage of this method is 
that it controls for common factors that affect all banks simultaneously, such as the business cycle, 
inflation, regulatory changes or shifts in risk attitude. Most importantly, it eliminates unobserved 
time-related shocks that could violate the assumption that the errors are independently distributed 
across clusters (Worms, 2003; Roodman, 2006).  
The disadvantage of time dummies is that variables that are identical for every bank at time t, such 
as the current monetary policy rate, cannot be directly included in the regressions. A set of time 
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dummies completely controls for the variation of such variables. However, a time-variant common 
variable can be interacted with a variable that varies across both time and clusters. This interaction 
term can be included in a regression with time dummies. The details are described further below. 
All right-hand side bank variables enter the regressions with one lag due to possible endogeneity 
issues arising from the balance-sheet nature of the data (Worms, 2003). This approach mitigates 
interpretation problems related to the causality of the estimated effects, though this method might 
not be completely effective. For example, it is conceivable that a bank (correctly) anticipates 
approving more loans next quarter, and therefore increases its deposit base this quarter. However, 
one would usually assume that the bank faces external constraints and, in a profit-maximization 
framework, adapts when these constraints change. Hence, one would presume that a more steady 
deposit base today would allow banks to increase lending going forward.  
The main dependent variable is quarter-on-quarter total loan growth, but some robustness checks 
make use of quarter-on-quarter commercial and industrial (C&I) loans or loans secured by real 
estate.  
 
 
2.3 Data and the US interbank market 
Bank data are taken from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) which are 
filed quarterly by all US commercial banks (for a description of the variables used, see Appendix A). 
The Call Reports have been available since 1976, though there have been several changes in the 
definition of many variables and several new variables have been introduced. The time horizon in 
this paper is 1990Q1 to 2010Q4, though for some comparisons, data going back to 1976Q1 are used. 
The sample is chosen to comprise several business cycles, ensure a relatively stable monetary policy 
and regulatory environment, as well as to limit the extent of variable redefinitions.  
The Call Report data have been ‘cleaned up’ by dropping observations for which total assets are 
negative, presumably typos. The same was done for all balance sheet variables that should be, by 
definition, non-negative. Due to the special nature of certain bank locations, data for American 
Samoa, the Federated States of Micronesia, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, and ‘not applicable’ 
(“0”, “XX”) have been removed. Bank balance sheet variables have been calculated as ratios of total 
assets or total liabilities, except for allowances for loan and lease losses, which is more meaningfully 
expressed as a ratio of total loans. Some variables, notably interbank lending and borrowing, as well 
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as liquidity, undergo changes in their Call Report definition.4 Although these changes are relatively 
minor, it is possible that there may be discontinuities in the variables. The time dummies may be 
able to take care of such discontinuities to a certain degree, and the screening mechanism for 
outliers described below should remove the affected observations in severe cases.  
Outliers are removed by discarding observations below the first and above the 99th percentile of all 
variables but size and the interest rate, unless the first percentile is zero. Additionally, the change of 
all ratios between two periods is computed, and observations for which the change in ratio falls 
below the first or above the 99th percentile are dropped. This process ensures that sudden large 
changes in the balance sheet composition of a bank, possibly due to mergers or acquisitions (M&As), 
do not bias the results.5 The choice of the percentiles is arbitrary, but for every variable a visual 
inspection was undertaken to ensure an adequate distribution of observations. 
Size interaction variables are created by multiplying the respective balance-sheet or interest rate 
variable by the bank size variable. In a panel framework, one potential bias can arise in interaction 
variables when a coefficient of interest varies with the panel identifier, such as banks in this paper 
(Balli & Sørensen, 2012). In this case, the coefficients of the interaction terms may incorrectly pick 
up differences in the bank-specific slopes of the variables. Balli & Sørensen (2012) show that the 
subtraction of bank-specific means from each variable in the interaction term can eliminate this 
potential bias, a suggestion that is implemented in this paper. The variable ‘bank size’ was 
additionally modified by subtracting the time-varying mean across all banks from the log of assets of 
bank n. This process results in a more meaningful interpretation of the coefficients of the interaction 
terms because they measure the effect for a bank of average size (Worms, 2003). It also removes 
unwanted trends in bank size (Ehrmann, Gambacorta, Martinez-Pages, Sevestre & Worms, 2003).  
To measure the interaction effects for banks of different sizes, the mean is replaced by the 
respective size percentile of interest. This process is crucial to the understanding of the methodology 
                                                          
4
 In the case of interbank lending, for observations before 2001Q4, series rcfd1350 was used. After 2003Q1, 
the Call Reports have individual series for federal funds purchased (rcfdb987) and securities sold (rcfdb989), so 
these two series are added together. In 2002, only the rcon series for domestic offices are available. Interbank 
borrowing is handled accordingly (series rcfd2800, rcfdb993, rcfdb995). Liquidity consists of series rcfd0390 
until 1993Q4 and the sum of series rcfd1754 and rcfd1773 afterwards as indicated on the Federal Reserve Data 
Dictionary website. 
5
 It is not clear whether alternative methods of dealing with M&As would be better. Some options include 
discarding all banks that have merged or gotten acquired (e.g. Favero, Giavazzi, & Flabbi, 1999), combining 
banks involved in an M&A before the period in which it took place (e.g. Peek & Rosengren, 1995; Worms, 
2003; Gambacorta & Mistrulli, 2004) or dropping the bank observations for the quarter in which a merger took 
place (e.g. Kashyap & Stein, 1995). The method chosen here does not lead to a large loss of observations and is 
purely data-driven. It basically assumes that, at a given point in time, two banks with similar characteristics 
such as size, but with one bank having been affected by an M&A, will behave similarly after a sufficiently short 
period of time. To the extent this period increases, this method will be less accurate. 
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used in this paper. To see why, assume that the size variable would not be re-centered at all. In this 
case, the coefficient   in the model equation above would measure the effect of a change in b for an 
average bank with no assets (size 0). This does not make sense in the first place, since banks do have 
positive assets. Additionally, it may not be in the researcher’s interest to measure the effect of b at 
this size level. Therefore, by centering the size variable on different points of the size spectrum so 
that it is zero at the size level of interest, one can measure the remaining coefficients as well as their 
significance and analyze their changes as size varies.  
Data on not seasonally-adjusted county- or state-level employment come from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) program. The monthly employment figures are 
averaged by quarter, converted to logs and first-differenced. If data on county-level employment are 
unavailable, missing data are replaced with state-level employment. The federal funds rate is taken 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.  
Table 2.1 summarizes some of the key statistics for the first and final quarter of the sample, as well 
as for the adjusted dataset as described above. 
 
Table 2.1. Key US bank statistics    
 1990Q1 2010Q4 1990Q1 – 2010Q4 
Number of banks 13,733 7,284 17,291 
Total number of observations - - 832,224 
Aggregate asset size (US$ trillion) 4.2 15.5 8.5 
Aggregate asset size (2005 US$ trillion) 6.3 13.8 9.1 
Aggregate asset size as share of US GDP 72.7% 105.2% 79.1% 
Total lending-to-asset ratio 54.0% 61.5% 58.9% 
Interbank lending-to-asset ratio 6.9% 2.3% 4.0% 
Interbank borrowing-to-asset ratio 1.6% 1.4% 1.4% 
Liquidity-to-asset ratio 28.5% 21.0% 26.1% 
Cash-to-asset ratio 7.6% 9.6% 5.4% 
Capital-asset ratio 9.3% 11.8% 10.2% 
Deposit-to-liability ratio 96.6% 92.8% 94.8% 
Goodwill-to-asset ratio 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 
Note: Numbers do not sum to 100% on either the asset or liability side since not all balance sheet items are 
included. 
Source: Author’s calculation based on US Call Report data, IMF International Financial Statistics 
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Although the numbers are neither seasonally nor cyclically adjusted, and hence have to be taken 
with a grain of salt, some broad trends emerge. The number of banks has decreased by almost half 
during the sample period. At the same time, new banks have been created as demonstrated by the 
total number of more than 17,000 individual banks over the whole sample period. This consolidation 
and evolution of the US banking industry has been documented elsewhere (Wheelock & Wilson, 
2004; Jones & Critchfield, 2005). The aggregate size of this sector has almost doubled in real terms, 
and increased by 45% as a share of GDP. 
The largest asset position, total lending to the real economy, is used as the dependent variable C is 
the baseline regression. It comprises, among others, loans secured by real estate, commercial and 
industrial loans, and loans to individuals for personal expenditure. It has on average increased by 7.5 
percentage points as a share of total assets. Interbank lending has decreased by two-thirds as a 
share of assets, while interbank borrowing has remained relatively stable. Liquidity in the form of 
securities has lost somewhat of its importance, but comprises on average more than 25% of bank 
assets over the whole sample. The cash ratio has declined throughout most of the sample period up 
to the financial crisis, when banks started holding large amounts of cash. The capital-asset ratio has 
continuously increased by about 2.5 percentage points. Although the goodwill ratio is very small on 
average, one should keep in mind that it may play a larger role for certain banks. For example, in 
2010Q4, goodwill amounts to 6.4% of total assets for banks at the 99th percentile.  
It is important to consider a comprehensive selection of balance sheet variables, since they may 
have their own individual characteristics and fulfill different roles for different banks. Therefore, 
interbank lending and borrowing are reported individually here, while many papers only focus on 
one of these positions, such as lending (Worms 2003), or net out interbank activities (Ehrmann & 
Worms, 2001). Similarly to goodwill, although the average numbers for interbank activities are 
relatively low, their distribution can be quite dispersed. For example, the interbank lending ratio for 
institutions at the 99th percentile is about 23%.  
It is a common finding in the literature that especially small banks tend to be net providers of 
liquidity to large banks (Ho & Saunders, 1985; Allen & Saunders, 1986; Furfine, 1999; Stigum & 
Crescenzi, 2007). The reason is that small banks, in the short term, often take in more deposits than 
they can hand out in loans to potential customers, since their geographical range is usually limited. 
The banks can earn interest on this surplus by selling it to a regional bank overnight which in turn 
would collect funds from many small banks and re-sell them to a money center institution. The 
following figure illustrates this result by calculating the average of interbank lending and interbank 
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borrowing as a share of a bank’s total assets by bank size percentile for the sample period of 1990Q1 
– 2010Q4. 
 
Figure 2.1. Average of interbank lending and interbank borrowing as a share of a bank’s total assets by bank 
size percentile, 1990Q1 – 2010Q4 
 
 
The interbank lending ratio decreases from about 7% to almost 2% as banks get larger, but ticks up 
for very large banks above the 97th percentile. However, this behavior of the interbank lending ratio 
for large institutions is not consistent over time: it is only present in the first half of the sample 
period, but goes away in the second half, when there is a continuous decline. The interbank 
borrowing ratio is below 1% for banks up to the 53rd size percentile, and rises up to 7% for the 
largest banks. 
Most banks are regular providers or buyers of federal funds and it is not the norm for them to switch 
their status, as shown in Table 2.2. For instance, 89% of all banks that were lending in the interbank 
market in a given quarter did so in the next quarter as well, while 8.5% of banks that did not borrow 
in the interbank market in one quarter did so in the next. This is important since it suggests that 
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banks’ participation in the interbank market does not happen by accident, driven by random factors, 
but is a strategic business decision that banks make about the management of their balance sheets. 
 
Table 2.2.  Transition probabilities of participating in interbank lending and borrowing in quarter q+1, given 
participation in quarter q, percent 
Interbank lending No participation in q+1 Participation in q+1 Total 
No participation in q 66.1 33.9 100.0 
Participation in q 11.0 89.0 100.0 
Total 24.1 75.9 100.0 
Interbank borrowing No participation in q+1 Participation in q+1 Total 
No participation in q 91.5 8.5 100.0 
Participation in q 14.9 85.1 100.0 
Total 64.5 35.5 100.0 
Source: Author’s calculation based on US Call Report data (1990Q1 – 2010Q4) 
 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Baseline regressions 
Table 2.3 shows several baseline regression results with and without interaction terms. Regressions 
1 and 2 represent the time period from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4, while Regressions 3 and 4 use data from 
the period covered by the seminal Kashyap & Stein paper (1995, henceforth KS), 1976Q1 to 1992Q2.  
Regression 1 specifies a parsimonious model with no interaction variables except for the ‘credit 
channel’ term, while Regression 2 uses the full set of control variables. A comparison of the 
coefficients between both regressions does not reveal substantial differences. Most notably, the 
capital-asset ratio coefficient is larger and the deposit ratio is not significant in Regression 1. The 
similarity is not surprising given that all bank balance sheet variables as well as bank size are 
measured at their mean as described above. This means that the coefficients for every variable are 
estimated for a bank of average size. Section 2.4.2 analyses the sensitivity of the results when the 
size variable is allowed to differ from its mean. 
Most bank balance sheet variables have the expected sign. The size variable is negative and 
significant in Regressions 1 and 2. One explanation is that larger banks have more diversified asset 
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portfolios than smaller banks and hence lower overall loan growth. In other words, a larger 
institution has more options to invest its funds, while a smaller one tends to increase its investments 
in loans if possible.  
The next variable, ∆i*size, is central to the analysis of the credit channel. The change in the federal 
funds rate is interacted with size, modified as described in Section 2.3. Note that monetary policy 
cannot be included directly in a regression with time dummies because they are perfect controls for 
variables with no bank-variation. If the credit channel view is correct, the interaction term should be 
positive: A restrictive monetary policy should have a less negative effect on lending growth for a 
larger than for a smaller bank. The credit channel term is insignificant in the first two regressions, so 
there is no evidence for a credit channel in the US banking sector. This difference with other papers 
in this literature could arise because a larger set of control variables is included in this paper, 
accounting more precisely for the composition of bank balance sheets. 
In Regression 2, the ratios of interbank lending, interbank borrowing, liquidity, cash, capital, 
deposits, and goodwill are all significantly positive, while allowances for lease and loan losses are 
significantly negative. The magnitude of the coefficients differs considerably for these variables. For 
example, a one percentage increase in the average bank’s liquidity ratio is associated with an 
increase in the lending growth rate of about 9 basis points. Cash holdings have a similar coefficient. 
This finding supports the hypothesis that banks with sound balance sheets that can absorb shocks by 
reducing their cash holdings or selling off securities are able to shelter their loan portfolio (Kashyap 
& Stein, 2000; Gambacorta, 2005). The effects are larger for interbank lending (14 basis points) and 
goodwill (23 basis points), but smaller in the case of interbank borrowing (1.3 basis points) and 
deposits (0.9 basis points).  
Likewise, a higher capital-asset ratio is related to higher lending growth. An increase of one 
percentage point is associated with about 12 basis points of stronger lending growth. Deposits are 
only positively correlated with lending growth in the full-set Regression 2. Since it is usually assumed 
that deposits are a very stable and reliable source of funding because a bank with a higher share of 
such funds can enter, ceteris paribus, into more customer relationships or pay out higher loans than 
a bank with a weaker deposit base, the inclusion of the interaction terms seems preferable to the 
alternative specification in Regression 1. Alternatively, banks with a stable deposit base might not be 
required to reduce their lending by as much in bad times (Berlin & Mester, 1999; Shin, 2009; 
Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian, 2011). The effect is rather small, with a 1 percentage point 
increase in the deposit ratio indicating an increase of around one basis point in lending growth.  
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Allowances for loan and lease losses (ALLL) are considered to be a proxy for bank-idiosyncratic risk. 
Since they are calculated not as a ratio of total assets but of total loans, they are not interacted with 
the interest rate in order to make sure the results are comparable. A bank with a higher ALLL ratio 
may either have a more risky loan portfolio, suggesting a negative relationship with lending, or it 
may be more careful and therefore have more precautionary provisions, possibly implying a positive 
correlation. It is not possible to disentangle these two effects with the data provided, but the large 
negative coefficient of -1.2 for this variable indicates that the first effect should prevail. 
Changes in (the log of) county-level employment are associated with a higher lending growth rate. 
One reason might be that an increase in employment is a proxy for increased business activity, so 
firms would hire workers and demand bank loans to match their full order books. Additionally, a 
higher employment number usually indicates stronger household balance sheets, so more 
individuals should qualify for loans, such as for cars and consumption goods, or mortgages. 
County-level employment numbers are an imperfect proxy for demand factors influencing bank 
balance sheets. First, a bank does not necessarily lend only in the county in which it is located, or it 
might just approve loans in a subsection of its county. Second, employment numbers do not directly 
factor in the particularities of an individual bank’s balance sheet. For example, the exposure of 
banks’ loan portfolios to various industrial sectors might differ, with overall employment not 
reflecting the different compositions. Third, there might be the issue of reverse causality. A supply-
side induced increase in bank lending to firms or in mortgages might allow companies to hire more 
workers. This could result in higher construction activity, leading to a positive correlation between 
lending growth and employment. However, the hiring decision of firms is more likely to be directly 
based on the demand for their products than on the availability of credit, and the demand for 
mortgages should depend, over a long time horizon, on the strength of household balance sheets. 
Ideally, one would want to use data on the specific structure of banks’ loan portfolios to control for 
demand effects, but such data are not publically available. To help make up for this lack of 
availability, the robustness analysis discussed in Section 2.4.4 uses commercial & industrial loans, as 
well as loans secured by real estate, as the dependent variable to distinguish between differential 
effects of various loan types, and the results of this analysis mostly hold up qualitatively. This shows 
that while county-level employment is not a perfect proxy for demand factors, it should perform 
reasonably well. 
As for the interest rate interaction terms in Regression 2,             , the coefficients are positive 
in the case of interbank lending, negative for interbank borrowing and insignificant for all other 
variables. These results show that interest rate changes get transmitted through certain banks’ 
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balance sheet positions since the interest rate coefficient depends on the structure of banks’ assets 
and liabilities. For example, in Regression 2, the direct effect of a change in the interest rate would 
be, ceteris paribus, 1.77 basis points higher (less negative) for a bank with a one percentage point 
higher interbank lending rate. For liquidity, this effect is 0.3 basis points, but is insignificant. Note 
that all these coefficients are estimated for a bank of average size. Section 2.4.2 shows that the 
results may change for banks of different sizes. 
 
Table 2.3. Regression results 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
 Parsimonious model, 
baseline period 
Full model, 
baseline period 
Parsimonious 
model, KS period 
Full model,  
KS period 
Size -0.0140*** -0.0135*** -0.0075*** -0.0012 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009) 
Δi * size 0.0011 0.0011 0.0019*** 0.0007 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Interbank lending 0.1493*** 0.1418*** 0.1793*** 0.1790*** 
 (0.0041) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
   Size interaction  -0.1473***  -0.1384*** 
  (0.0155)  (0.0117) 
   i interaction  0.0177***  -0.0031*** 
  (0.0061)  (0.0011) 
   joint interaction  -0.0466**  -0.0025 
  (0.0215)  (0.0056) 
Interbank borrowing 0.0143** 0.0137** -0.0168 -0.0352*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
   Size interaction  -0.0759***  0.1110*** 
  (0.0216)  (0.0184) 
   i interaction  -0.0326***  -0.0137*** 
  (0.0112)  (0.0021) 
   joint interaction  -0.0115  0.0309*** 
  (0.0334)  (0.0094) 
Liquidity ratio 0.0909*** 0.0907*** 0.1114*** 0.1145*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0017) 
   Size interaction  -0.0168*  0.0091 
  (0.0091)  (0.0092) 
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   i interaction  0.0030  -0.0028*** 
  (0.0027)  (0.0010) 
   joint interaction  0.0121  0.0036 
  (0.0084)  (0.0049) 
Cash ratio 0.0929*** 0.0869*** 0.1709*** 0.1697*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0033) 
   Size interaction  -0.0628***  -0.0514*** 
  (0.0173)  (0.0152) 
   i interaction  -0.0054  -0.0114*** 
  (0.0075)  (0.0018) 
   joint interaction  -0.0280  -0.0001 
  (0.0255)  (0.0088) 
Capital-asset ratio 0.1890*** 0.1160*** 0.2870*** 0.1864*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0145) (0.0097) (0.0097) 
   Size interaction  -0.3362***  -0.6206*** 
  (0.1069)  (0.0294) 
   i interaction  -0.0212  -0.0291*** 
  (0.0156)  (0.0049) 
   joint interaction  -0.0932  0.0046 
  (0.0701)  (0.0148) 
Deposit ratio 0.0040 0.0090** 0.0098 0.0070 
 (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0106) (0.0105) 
   Size interaction  -0.0111  0.1242*** 
  (0.0116)  (0.0240) 
   i interaction  0.0068  0.0048 
  (0.0053)  (0.0030) 
   joint interaction  -0.0293*  0.0358*** 
  (0.0158)  (0.0123) 
Goodwill ratio 0.1974*** 0.2302***   
 (0.0323) (0.0345)   
   Size interaction  0.0269   
  (0.1499)   
   i interaction  -0.0728   
  (0.0528)   
   joint interaction  0.0937   
  (0.1534)   
ALLL ratio -1.2159*** -1.1839*** -1.1838*** -1.1925*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0276) (0.0221) (0.0220) 
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   Size interaction  0.2878***  -0.4347*** 
  (0.1112)  (0.0964) 
Δ ln(employment) 0.1277*** 0.1275*** 0.4193*** 0.4169*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0128) (0.0128) 
Constant 0.0078*** 0.0066*** 0.0157*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
     
# observations 636,915 636,915 762,518 762,518 
# banks 15,194 15,194 18,176 18,176 
Time period 
1990Q1-2010Q4 1990Q1-2010Q4 1976Q1-1992Q2 
1976Q1-
1992Q2 
Average T 42.0 42.0 42.0 42.0 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
respectively. The size variable is centered at its mean for each quarter. Time dummies not shown. Full 
regression equation: 
(           )
      
                  (               )             (                )    (            )  
   (                      )                 (                     )                    
 
 
Table 2.3 also lists results for the KS period of 1976Q1 to 1992Q2 in Regressions 3 and 4. While the 
average time horizon is identical at 42 quarters, this sample has a larger number of banks, indicative 
of the continuous consolidation in the industry, so the number of total observations available is 
larger. Note that data for the variable goodwill is only available since 1985Q2, so it is dropped from 
the estimation. Otherwise, the same Call Report variables are used as in KS, though they are not 
necessarily added together the same way in order to show the differences, while employment and 
the interest rate are defined as described above. 
One notable difference between the baseline sample and the KS sample is that the credit channel 
term is significant in the parsimonious regression (#3), while it is insignificant in the full-scale model 
(#4). This indicates that the interaction variables are important to correctly capture the effect of a 
change in the interest rate. If the interaction terms are omitted, the regression will incorrectly 
attribute variation to the credit channel term, while in the true model, changes in the interest rate 
work through the balance sheet variables, and not through size per se. This is an important 
difference to the results of Kashyap & Stein (1995). 
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There are additional differences to the baseline sample. Several coefficients have the opposite sign, 
most notably interbank borrowing. Similarly, size and interest rate interaction terms for several 
variables have different signs. The coefficient on employment is much larger.  
While these differences seem substantial, they only measure the coefficients for a bank of average 
size. One can get a much more detailed understanding of the relationships by comparing banks 
across all sizes, as outlined in the next section. 
 
2.4.2 Size dependence 
So far, the coefficients discussed have been determined for banks of average size. But the structure 
of the model also allows for the estimation of the effects on banks of any desired size by centering 
the size variable not at its average, but at whichever size one would like to examine. Based on this 
analysis, the relationships between different balance sheet positions, as well as the monetary 
transmission channel, can be examined more precisely because it allows distinguishing the effects 
for banks of different size. 
Figure 2.1 shows the results based on the model used in Regression 2 (baseline sample) for seven 
bank balance sheet variables and interest rate interaction terms in dependence of each size centile. 
For example, the coefficients at the 50th percentile show the effects for a bank of median size.  
For the non-interacted variables on the left, the coefficients usually decrease with bank size. For 
example, interbank lending has a coefficient of more than .2 for a bank at the 10th percentile, but it 
is indistinguishable from zero for a bank at the 99th percentile of the size distribution. Interbank 
borrowing coefficients are much smaller for a large part of the size spectrum. They turn from 
significantly positive for small banks to significantly negative for large institutions. Liquidity, 
however, shows a different pattern, with the coefficients remaining remarkably stable around .1. 
This pattern is strikingly different from interbank lending, so it does not seem appropriate to 
aggregate the two variables, as is often the case (e.g. Gambacorta, 2005). Cash holdings show a 
similar behavior as interbank lending. Although the capital coefficient is much larger than the one for 
deposits, both variables exhibit a similar pattern in that they are significantly positive for small and 
medium banks, but they turn significantly negative for very large banks. One explanation could be 
that for large banks with sophisticated balance-sheet management techniques, a higher capital ratio 
is not a sign of a strong balance sheet, but of a less efficiently managed one. In this case, one would 
expect a large bank to have a lower lending growth rate. Similarly, large banks rely on deposits to a 
lesser degree than small institutions. For a large bank, a higher deposit ratio could be a sign of a less 
The US Interbank Market, Bank Size, and the Credit Channel 53 
well diversified entity, implying a lower lending rate. Goodwill is significantly and positively related 
to lending growth, except for very small banks. 
As for the interaction terms on the right side of Figure 2.1, the two terms that have significant 
portions are interbank lending (positive up to the 70th percentile) and interbank borrowing (negative 
except for banks below the 14th percentile). This means that, in response to an increase in the 
interest rate, the lending growth rate of small banks is significantly higher (less negative) than that of 
large banks the higher interbank lending becomes. The opposite is true for interbank borrowing: 
After an increase in the interest rate, the lending growth rate for all but very small banks is 
significantly more negative the higher interbank borrowing gets. Intuitively, these opposite results 
make sense because banks with a higher interbank lending buffer are in a better position to weather 
increases in the interest rate, while banks that rely to a larger extent on interbank borrowing for 
funding are more vulnerable when the interest rate goes up. The positive effect for interbank 
lending goes away for large banks, indicating that this variable is not important for the transmission 
of interest rate changes for this group. One possible explanation is that large banks have more 
means at their disposal to mitigate the effects of policy changes, so they depend less on interbank 
lending as a buffer to shelter their loan portfolio.  
All other interest rate interaction variables are insignificant for banks of all sizes (only the cash 
interaction term is significant for banks above the 97th percentile). This indicates that the 
relationship between the respective bank balance sheet variables and lending growth is independent 
of the stance of monetary policy.  
In conclusion, for the baseline sample, changes in the policy rate affect the relationship between a 
bank’s balance sheet position and lending growth only in the case of interbank lending and 
borrowing. Especially small and medium sized banks benefit from a higher interbank lending ratio to 
mitigate the effect of interest rate changes.  
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Figure 2.2. Size dependence of balance sheet coefficients, baseline sample (1990Q1 – 2010Q4) 
  
  
  
  
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
interbank lending 
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
∆i*interbank lending 
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
interbank borrowing 
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
∆i*interbank borrowing 
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
liquidity 
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
∆i*liquidity 
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
cash 
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
∆i*cash 
The US Interbank Market, Bank Size, and the Credit Channel 55 
  
  
  
Note the different scales on the right and left side of the figure. Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval. 
1
 The scale is different for this variable. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the same variables except for goodwill, but for the Kashyap & Stein sample period 
of 1976Q1 to 1992Q2, as a way to assess changes in the relationships between the variables over 
time. As for the non-interacted variables on the left side of the figure, many of them resemble the 
results from Figure 2.1. Interbank lending and cash holdings are now significantly positive for the 
whole size spectrum, while they were insignificant for large banks in Figure 2.1. The liquidity 
coefficients are nearly identical. The capital-asset ratio curve has a very similar shape, but is more 
precisely estimated.  
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However, interbank borrowing and deposits are now upward-sloping, resulting in a significantly 
negative correlation with lending growth for small banks and, in the case of deposits, resulting in a 
significantly positive correlation for large banks. One explanation for this change in the effects of 
interbank borrowing could be that this funding source used to be seen as a sign of trouble, i.e. banks 
were not able to attract enough deposits, so they had to rely on the interbank market the fill the 
funding gap. However, more recently, banks have developed more sophisticated methods to 
manage their balance sheet and access to short-term funds in the interbank market has been one of 
the strategies employed to boost returns (FDIC, 2005)6, though there are considerable risks of this 
strategy (Shin, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010). However, this supposition would fail to 
explain the negative correlation for large banks in the baseline sample.  
The right column of the figure shows the interest rate interaction coefficients. One notable 
difference to the results found in Figure 2.1 is that the coefficients are usually smaller, but more 
often significant: Except for the deposit term, an increase in the interest rate is associated with a 
more negative effect of the respective balance sheet variable on lending growth. This makes sense in 
the case of interbank borrowing if one assumes that this sort of funding is less reliable, but it is 
somewhat puzzling in the other cases. In contrast to the results in Figure 2.1, the deposits 
interaction term is significantly positive for banks above the 53rd percentile. One interpretation could 
be that a higher deposit ratio helped banks to shelter their loan portfolio from interest rate changes 
during the KS sample period, but the roles have changed in the more recent period when interbank 
lending seems to fulfill a similar function.  
Several reasons may be responsible for the changes between Figures 2.1 and 2.2, though it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to pinpoint the exact causes or elaborate the precise mechanisms. One 
potentially important factor might be changes to the regulatory environment such as the 
introduction of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 or the 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. Similarly, changes in the implementation of monetary 
policy, e.g. the Fed’s monetarist experiment which occurred from 1979-1982, the borrowed-reserves 
operating procedure, or today’s interest-targeting regime, may also have influenced the 
transmission channel. Another reason could be technological advances in information and 
communications technologies, such as computers and the internet. Based on all of these factors, 
banks’ business models and the structure of the banking industry may have changed, for example 
contributing to the process of rapid consolidation described in Section 2.3. 
                                                          
6
 Section 6.1: Liquidity and Funds Management, p.11: “Some institutions may access Federal funds routinely, 
perhaps as a liability management technique whereby the buyer (borrower) attempts to utilize the acquired 
funds to support a rapid expansion of its loan-investment posture as a means of enhancing profits.” 
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Figure 2.3. Size dependence of balance sheet coefficients, KS sample (1976Q1 – 1992Q2) 
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Note the different scales on the right and left side of the figure. Dashed lines represent the 95% confidence 
interval. 
 
2.4.3 Comparison with the analysis in Kashyap & Stein (1995)  
Kashyap & Stein (1995) employ a different strategy to identify the credit channel in the US. First, 
they aggregate all bank balance sheets and therefore do not use a panel framework. Second, they 
sort banks into different size categories and run regressions only for the respective groups. 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to qualitatively compare their results with the methodology used in 
this paper for the same sample period of 1976Q1 to 1992Q2. Note that KS use economic variables 
such as GDP which are identical for all banks, so these variables will drop out in a panel framework 
with time dummies.  
KS find that lending of the largest 1% of banks does not have any significant reaction to a change in 
the interest rate, while the effect is significantly negative for banks below the 98th percentile and 
increasingly so the smaller they become. At first glance, these findings are supported by the results 
of Regression 3 in Table 2.3 which applies the same regression model as in the baseline scenario, but 
for the KS period. The credit channel term, ∆i*size, is significantly positive, corroborating the view 
that the smaller a bank, the more negative the effect of a contraction in monetary policy on lending. 
However, Regression 4 casts some doubts on this conclusion because the credit channel term 
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becomes insignificant when accounting for a larger set of bank control variables. Running 
regressions for every size percentile yields a U-shaped dependency of the credit channel term on 
size (graph not shown), with only very small and very large banks having a significantly positive 
credit channel coefficient. This result contradicts KS because they find a gradually more negative 
effect the smaller banks become. 
Several causes could be attributed to this discrepancy. First, KS use the growth rate of lending, 
aggregated by the respective bank size group, as the dependent variable, while this paper utilizes a 
panel framework with individual bank data. Second, KS use only macro control variables such as 
changes in the CPI or nominal GDP, but no bank-specific controls. This may be problematic if other 
bank characteristics are systematically correlated with bank size. For example, if smaller banks are 
more exposed to credit risk than larger banks, it is perceivable that small institutions will react more 
strongly to restrictive monetary policy than large ones, even if size per se is uncorrelated with 
lending behavior. As such, the regression used by KS might then wrongly attribute the variation in 
riskiness to differences in size. Third, KS use seasonal dummies and a different lag structure. 
In conclusion, the model described and developed in this paper enables a more differentiated 
picture than in KS. The role of individual balance sheet positions can be examined in greater detail. 
Their main result, a direct size dependence of interest rate changes, can only be partly confirmed.  
 
2.4.4 Robustness analysis 
The results of this paper hold up for a wide range of robustness checks, though there are some 
exceptions. First, the dependent variable, total loan growth, is replaced in turn by two important 
sub-categories, commercial and industrial (C&I) loans (Table 2.47, Regression 5) and loans secured by 
real estate (Regression 6). In both cases, for banks of average size, the credit channel term is 
insignificant, emphasizing the importance of accurately accounting for all the balance sheet channels 
through which monetary policy may work. While the real estate loan regression is very similar to the 
baseline scenario, one noteworthy difference in the C&I loan regression is the fact that the interest 
rate-interbank interaction terms are insignificant. This would indicate that the effects of interbank 
lending and borrowing on the monetary transmission channel would be more relevant for real estate 
lending. Also, the deposit ratio coefficient has the opposite sign in Regression 5. 
                                                          
7
 Regression 2 is reproduced from Table 2.3 for convenience. 
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In a second check (Regression 7), a different definition of size is used. Instead of calculating the log 
of total assets, a bank’s asset share of the aggregated assets of the whole banking system is 
computed for every quarter. This method takes care of potential issues that could arise because 
bank assets are increasing over time. In the original size definition, this issue is addressed by re-
centering bank size in every quarter. But if banks grow larger over time, the dispersion around the 
zero mean will increase. This alternative definition normalizes the aggregate size of the banking 
sector to one, and therefore only relative shifts in the size of banks matter, but not overall growth. 
Nevertheless, the regression shows that the results are very similar to the benchmark, and also the 
behavior across banks of different size is very close to the baseline scenario. Not unexpectedly, the 
size interaction terms are affected most, with several of them changing their sign or significance. 
However, the main results, especially with respect to the interest rate-interbank interaction terms, 
hold for this specification as well. 
In Regression 8, the interest rate is replaced by the residuals of a vector autoregression (VAR) model 
that are thought to represent the exogenous component of monetary policy. This model is 
comprised of a GDP volume index, inflation, an oil price index, a real effective exchange rate index, 
and the federal funds rate as endogenous variables. These variables all come from the IMF’s 
International Financial Statistics database. A time trend and quarterly dummy variables are included 
as exogenous variables. The VAR model is estimated with three lags. The coefficients are used to 
calculate the residuals in response to a shock to the federal funds rate. These residuals can be 
interpreted as the exogenous component of monetary policy that is independent of the business 
cycle to which the central bank responds endogenously. Since the objective is to measure the effects 
of the interest rate, and not of the business cycle, these residuals should, in theory, be a better 
method to identify the impact of changes in monetary policy than the federal funds rate (Bernanke 
& Mihov, 1998; Uhlig, 1998). However, as Worms (2003) points out, the validity of both the federal 
funds rate and the VAR residuals rests on their own specific assumptions. First, to be able to 
correctly assess the impact of monetary policy, one needs to assume that the VAR residuals have a 
comparable effect to the federal funds rate. Additionally, the VAR residuals depend on the 
specification of the VAR model, while the federal funds rate is directly observable. Indeed, the 
results were sensitive to the specification of the VAR model, so the residuals of the most plausible 
specification were chosen.  
The federal funds rate, as mentioned above, suffers from an endogeneity problem because the 
central bank reacts to other economic variables, confounding the proper measurement of the 
effects of changes in the interest rate. Worms (2003) concludes that any potential endogeneity issue 
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of the federal funds rate is likely to be less severe in regressions such as those undertaken in this 
paper, because monetary policy is unlikely to react to individual bank information and it enters the 
regressions with a lag. Hence, in this paper, the focus has been on regressions with the federal funds 
rate, but the VAR residual results may nevertheless provide a useful robustness check. As can be 
seen from Regression 8, the credit channel term is again insignificant. The two major differences 
with respect to the baseline regression are that the interest rate interaction term with interbank 
borrowing is insignificant, while it has become highly significant for cash holdings. Moreover, one 
can examine the marginally significant interest rate-interbank lending term for banks of average size 
in Regression 8 in greater detail by estimating the model for every size centile as in Figures 2.1 and 
2.2. This reveals that this term is significant at the 5% level for banks between the 58th and 90th 
percentile. This is a higher and smaller range than in the baseline scenario, in which it is significant 
from the first up to the 70th percentile.  
Additionally, different time horizons besides the one described in Section 2.4.1 have been chosen. 
Results are similar when excluding the financial crisis episode starting in 2007Q3. Results also do not 
change qualitatively in most cases when choosing the much shorter time period of 2004Q3 to 
2006Q4. Results during the financial crisis episode (2007Q3 to 2009Q4) differ by more, but this is not 
unexpected given the unique circumstances. Also, it is generally questionable whether choosing 
short time periods of only 10 quarters is sensible given that they do not comprise a full business 
cycle or represent episodes during which the monetary policy rate is exclusively falling and/or close 
to the zero bound.  
Another robustness check undertaken is to split the sample based on episodes of restrictive vs. 
accommodative monetary policy. The results are surprisingly similar for most variables, but the 
interest rate interaction terms are more often significant in times of increasing rates. One caveat of 
this procedure is the possibility that variables related to the business cycle may not be sufficiently 
accounted for in the regression. Since the sample is split based on the stance of monetary policy, this 
might introduce a bias in the estimation. However, the time dummies and macro-control variable 
should mitigate or potentially even do away with this issue. 
The errors      have also been clustered not at the bank, but the county and state levels, 
respectively. Note that some observations get lost in these cases since banks whose physical 
locations change from one county or state to another need to be excluded. This change in the 
assumption of the error structure does not, however, lead to qualitatively different results. 
 
The US Interbank Market, Bank Size, and the Credit Channel 62 
Table 2.4. Robustness checks 
Variable Regression 2 Regression 5 Regression 6 Regression 7 Regression 8 
 Full model, 
base period 
Dep. var.: C&I 
lending 
Dep. var.: Real 
estate lending 
Alternative 
size definition 
Alt. interest 
rate definition 
Size -0.0135*** -0.0202*** -0.0145*** -0.0106*** -0.0128*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0035) (0.0007) 
Δi * size 0.0011 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0000 0.0002 
 (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0044) (0.0004) 
Interbank lending 0.1418*** 0.1463*** 0.0865*** 0.1617*** 0.1392*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0076) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0044) 
   Size interaction -0.1473*** -0.1467*** -0.1491*** 0.0762 -0.1380*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0237) (0.0168) (0.0537) (0.0170) 
   i interaction 0.0177*** 0.0198 0.0187** 0.0190*** 0.0074* 
 (0.0061) (0.0135) (0.0073) (0.0063) (0.0041) 
   joint interaction -0.0466** -0.0147 -0.0301 -0.1855 0.0114 
 (0.0215) (0.0398) (0.0265) (0.1157) (0.0123) 
Interbank borrowing 0.0137** -0.0341** 0.0533*** 0.0207*** 0.0133* 
 (0.0070) (0.0133) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0071) 
   Size interaction -0.0759*** -0.0511 -0.0694*** -0.0015 -0.0716*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0400) (0.0242) (0.0541) (0.0227) 
   i interaction -0.0326*** 0.0255 -0.0232* -0.0322*** -0.0042 
 (0.0112) (0.0246) (0.0135) (0.0112) (0.0077) 
   joint interaction -0.0115 -0.1080 0.0341 0.0372 0.0161 
 (0.0334) (0.0679) (0.0393) (0.1149) (0.0189) 
Liquidity ratio 0.0907*** 0.1014*** 0.0722*** 0.0912*** 0.0926*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
   Size interaction -0.0168* -0.0262** -0.0153 0.0952** -0.0179* 
 (0.0091) (0.0132) (0.0093) (0.0448) (0.0105) 
   i interaction 0.0030 0.0106* 0.0029 0.0034 -0.0009 
 (0.0027) (0.0061) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0016) 
   joint interaction 0.0121 -0.0019 0.0015 0.1478* 0.0079* 
 (0.0084) (0.0161) (0.0099) (0.0836) (0.0045) 
Cash ratio 0.0869*** 0.1127*** 0.0649*** 0.1114*** 0.0908*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0096) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0051) 
   Size interaction -0.0628*** -0.0398 -0.0441** -0.0924 -0.0535*** 
 (0.0173) (0.0297) (0.0189) (0.0800) (0.0185) 
   i interaction -0.0054 0.0101 -0.0156* -0.0048 0.0155*** 
 (0.0075) (0.0185) (0.0093) (0.0075) (0.0053) 
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   joint interaction -0.0280 0.0372 -0.0708** 0.0141 0.0109 
 (0.0255) (0.0530) (0.0307) (0.2531) (0.0174) 
Capital-asset ratio 0.1160*** 0.1765*** 0.0998*** 0.2472*** 0.1139*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0222) (0.0153) (0.0109) (0.0170) 
   Size interaction -0.3362*** -0.2730** -0.3509*** -0.2643 -0.3087** 
 (0.1069) (0.1359) (0.1101) (0.3023) (0.1328) 
   i interaction -0.0212 -0.0106 -0.0172 -0.0285* -0.0008 
 (0.0156) (0.0330) (0.0172) (0.0151) (0.0078) 
   joint interaction -0.0932 -0.1723 -0.0941 0.5478 -0.0098 
 (0.0701) (0.1055) (0.0705) (0.5257) (0.0155) 
Deposit ratio 0.0090** -0.0291*** 0.0169*** 0.0243*** 0.0082** 
 (0.0037) (0.0073) (0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0038) 
   Size interaction -0.0111 0.0061 -0.0125 0.0584 -0.0080 
 (0.0116) (0.0265) (0.0123) (0.0466) (0.0129) 
   i interaction 0.0068 0.0189 -0.0042 -0.0029 -0.0002 
 (0.0053) (0.0129) (0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0036) 
   joint interaction -0.0293* -0.0643 -0.0397** -0.1068* 0.0116 
 (0.0158) (0.0425) (0.0174) (0.0642) (0.0076) 
Goodwill ratio 0.2302*** 0.3405*** 0.2434*** -0.0040 0.2371*** 
 (0.0345) (0.0628) (0.0382) (0.0320) (0.0353) 
   Size interaction 0.0269 -0.0701 -0.0505 0.2098 -0.0601 
 (0.1499) (0.2097) (0.1554) (0.3124) (0.1787) 
   i interaction -0.0728 -0.1787 0.0082 -0.0168 -0.0226 
 (0.0528) (0.1127) (0.0651) (0.0485) (0.0348) 
   joint interaction 0.0937 0.4438* -0.0347 0.2055 0.0339 
 (0.1534) (0.2447) (0.1702) (0.7271) (0.0681) 
ALLL ratio -1.1839*** -1.4471*** -1.2336*** -1.2254*** -1.1243*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0505) (0.0318) (0.0269) (0.0288) 
   Size interaction 0.2878*** 0.2227 0.2936** 0.1916 0.3837*** 
 (0.1112) (0.1792) (0.1200) (0.3845) (0.1336) 
Δ ln(employment) 0.1275*** 0.0428*** 0.0429*** 0.1291*** 0.1267*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0127) (0.0051) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Constant 0.0066*** 0.0010 0.0029*** 0.0061*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) 
      
# observations 636,915 620,417 633,655 636,915 614,306 
# banks 15,194 15,004 15,153 15,194 15,122 
      
The US Interbank Market, Bank Size, and the Credit Channel 64 
Time period 1990Q1-
2010Q4 
1990Q1-
2010Q4 
1990Q1-
2010Q4 
1990Q1-
2010Q4 
1990Q1-
2010Q4 
Average T 42.0 41.0 42.0 42.0 41.0 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, 
respectively. The size variable is centered at its mean for each quarter. Time dummies not shown. Regression 2 
is reproduced from Table 2.3. Regressions 5 and 6 use C&I loan growth and growth of loans secured by real 
estate as the dependent variable, respectively. Regression 7 uses a different definition of size, while 
Regression 8 employs VAR residuals instead of the federal funds rate. See text for details. Full regression 
equation: 
(           )
      
                  (               )             (                )    (            )  
   (                      )                 (                     )                    
 
 
Another dimension that can be exploited as a robustness check is the geographic reach of banks. 
While there are many possible ways to use such geographic information (e.g. Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan & Stein, 2005; Aubuchon & Wheelock, 2010), a simple test is to see whether there 
are differences between banks that exist only within one county or state as opposed to banks that 
operate in several such units. The Call Reports do not have sufficient data to analyze this question, 
but such information can be extracted from the FDIC Summary of Deposits (SOD) and merged with 
the Call Reports. One limitation is that the SOD data are only available annually as of June 30. 
Additionally, they are not electronically accessible before 1994.8 The SOD database has information 
on branch office deposits for all FDIC-insured institutions. To infer whether banks operate on an 
interstate or intercounty level, this paper identifies the locations of all branches for each institution. 
Banks with branches in only one state / county are considered to operate only within the borders of 
the respective geographical unit.  
In order to combine the quarterly Call Report and annual SOD data, the assumption is made that the 
geographic information does not change during the four quarters of a given year. This is not 
unreasonable, given that most banks do not change their geographic scope in a given year. Only 
4.5% of banks go from doing business in one county to more than one county between two years, 
and the reverse is true for only 0.9% of banks. The numbers are 0.6% and 1.5% on the state level, 
respectively. As a matter of fact, only 844 banks accounting for 3.5% of all bank observations have 
done business in several states during any time between 1990 and 2010, vs. 6,829 banks and 39% of 
                                                          
8
 Source: FDIC website, accessed on 8/24/2012 at www2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp 
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observations on the county level. Since the size of the two bank groups on a state level is very 
disproportionate, the focus here will be a county-level comparison.  
Figure 2.3 combines the size-dependent coefficients for banks operating only within one county 
(solid line) and in several counties (dashed line). No confidence intervals are shown in order to avoid 
cluttering the graphs. With the exception of goodwill, the non-interacted variables are reasonably 
similar. In general, the multi-county estimates are more stable across banks of different size. One 
explanation could be that banks operating in several counties can better diversify their loan 
portfolio, which may render size differences less important.  
As for the interaction terms, interbank lending and borrowing are the variables that differ the most 
between the two bank types. The differences are not statistically significant though, i.e. the 
confidence intervals of the two bank types overlap. All other variables are very similar or nearly 
identical. The only other variables for which one could potentially expect a similar geographic 
asymmetry is deposits, though this does not seem to be the case here. The interbank interaction 
terms are significant for a wide size range only for single-county but not at all for multi-county 
banks. A higher interbank lending ratio is more important for single-county banks to mitigate a 
negative impact of restrictive monetary policy on lending than for multi-county banks. This is 
because banks operating in a narrowly circumscribed area find it more difficult to diversify their 
portfolio against shocks that hit on a local level than banks in a larger geographic region. Interbank 
lending is the natural choice to buffer such shocks because it is the most flexible and inexpensive 
solution (e.g. it does not involve high transaction costs incurred by the sale of securities). Similarly, 
interbank borrowing by single-county banks is most likely a sign of trouble or bad liabilities 
management, associated with lower lending growth. On the other hand, multi-county banks that are 
better geographically diversified are more likely to use it as a deliberate strategy to optimize their 
balance sheets and act as both lenders and borrowers in the interbank market. However, it is 
impossible to disentangle the two different motives here. As such, the evidence in this analysis is 
only circumstantial, but it is perfectly in line with the observation in Stigum & Crescenzi (2007) that 
federal funds flow from local banks toward the regional and money center banks. 
The evidence is also consistent with the relationship banking literature that holds that banks located 
closer to their clients, such as the ones operating in only a single county, attempt to shelter them 
from negative shocks to a larger degree than geographically diversified banks (Elyasiani & Goldberg, 
2004). Except for very small sizes, single-county banks seem to have higher (less negative) loan 
growth after a policy rate increase the higher their interbank lending buffer gets, while this is less 
the case for multi-county institutions. 
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Figure 2.4. Size dependence of balance sheet coefficients, single- vs. multi-county operations, 1994Q1 – 
2010Q4 
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Solid line: single-county regressions. Dashed line: multi-county regressions. Note the different scales on the 
right and left side of the figure.  
1
 The scale is different for this variable. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper has discussed and discovered several interesting aspects of banks’ behavior. First, lending 
growth depends strongly on banks’ balance sheet composition. This relationship varies for banks of 
different sizes, with small banks usually showing more pronounced reactions than large banks, 
especially with respect to the share of interbank lending and capital as a part of the balance sheet.  
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Second, the paper has uncovered in great detail how changes in monetary policy affect banks’ 
lending behavior. For the bank lending channel to operate, monetary policy must be able to alter the 
supply of bank loans. Controlling for demand factors and unobserved common factors, the paper 
finds that there is no evidence that the size of a bank per se is significantly related to lending growth 
when monetary policy changes. However, there is a distinct size effect in the reaction of individual 
balance sheet items. Most importantly, a higher interbank lending ratio may help small banks to 
better counter monetary policy shocks, while there is no significant effect for large banks. Hence, 
from a technical perspective, it is essential to control for a broad set of bank characteristics when 
analyzing the credit channel. Given that balance sheet positions have unique responses to changes in 
monetary policy, depending on a bank’s size, these positions should not be lumped together or 
netted out. This seems especially relevant for interbank lending and borrowing, which are so often 
overlooked and lumped in with other variables in papers covering this subject area. 
Furthermore, the precise transmission mechanism seems to change over time as innovations in 
monetary policy or technology take hold. It is essential to understand how banks manage their 
balance sheets in order to be able to adequately assess the effect that interest rates have on bank 
lending at any given point in time. Additionally, there is circumstantial evidence that interbank 
market activities play a more important role for banks operating in a narrowly defined region, such 
as a single county, as opposed to banks that are more geographically diversified.  
Further research should focus in greater detail on whether these results hold for different types of 
lending at a more disaggregated level, such as different types of mortgages or consumer loans. Also, 
one could further analyze interbank relations if counterparty data were used. This could shed more 
light on how interest rate changes work their way through the interbank market. Last, a more 
detailed analysis of the location of banks and their reach, combined with balance sheet information, 
could lead to a better understanding of the geographical dimension of monetary policy transmission. 
 
 
Appendix A. Description of variables from US Call Reports 
Variable name Series and item 
number 
Description 
Cash rcfd0010 Cash and balances due from depository institutions 
Interbank lending rcfd1350 Federal funds sold and securities purchased under 
agreement to resell 
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Loans rcfd1400 Total loans and leases, gross 
Loans secured by real estate rcfd1410 Loans secured by real estate 
Securities rcfd1754 Held-to-maturity securities 
Securities rcfd1773 Available-for-sale securities 
Commercial and industrial (C&I) 
loans 
rcfd1766 Commercial and industrial (C&I) loans 
Total assets rcfd2170 Sum of all assets 
Deposits rcfd2200 Total deposits 
Interbank borrowing rcfd2800 Federal funds purchased and securities sold under 
agreement to repurchase 
Total liabilities rcfd2950 Total liabilities 
ALLL rcfd3123 Allowance for loan and lease losses 
Capital rcfd3210 Total bank equity capital 
Federal funds sold rcfdb987 Federal funds sold in domestic offices 
Securities purchased rcfdb989 Securities purchased under agreement to resell 
Federal funds purchased rcfdb993 Federal funds purchased in domestic offices 
Securities sold rcfdb995 Securities sold under agreement to repurchase 
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3.1 Introduction 
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and its aftermath have pushed both academics and policy 
makers into uncharted territories. Many observers and forecasters initially underestimated the 
impact of the subprime mortgage crisis on the banking sector as well as the subsequent decline in 
output, the rise in unemployment, and the increase in government debt, and were surprised by the 
speed at which the process occurred. Central bankers in many countries felt impelled to not only 
decrease the policy rate to levels close to zero, but also engage in quantitative easing to an 
unprecedented degree to stimulate their respective economies.  
From an academic perspective, the financial crisis has boosted interest in models that can take 
account of so-called non-linearities, such as sudden discontinuities in economic variables, bounds on 
policy instruments, or different regimes. This interest is mainly due to the usefulness of non-
linearities in two broad strands of the literature: financial market frictions and the zero lower bound 
of the interest rate. 
In the first area, the financial crisis has sparked a large interest in modeling such phenomena that tie 
macroeconomics to frictions in financial markets, especially with respect to financial intermediaries 
(for an excellent overview, see Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, & Sannikov, 2012). Cúrdia & Woodford 
(2009) analyze a New Keynesian model with credit frictions that incorporates an interest rate spread 
between savers and borrowers. Christiano, Motto, & Rostagno (2010; 2013) augment a standard 
DSGE model with a financial accelerator and find that systemic fluctuations in risk drive the business 
cycle. Gertler & Karadi (2011) draw lessons for unconventional monetary policy from a quantitative 
monetary DSGE model with financial intermediaries that face endogenously determined balance 
sheet constraints. Brunnermeier & Sannikov (Forthcoming) study a macroeconomic model with a 
financial sector that causes economic volatility and crisis episodes. 
The second main area of research that the financial crisis and central bank reactions have stimulated 
is monetary policy in the presence of a zero lower bound on the policy interest rate. This lower 
bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that can be analyzed with similar tools as in the 
first area. Some recent examples of such research on the zero lower bound are Adam & Billi (2007), 
Fernández-Villaverde, Gordon, Guerrón-Quintana, & Rubio-Ramírez (2012), and Gavin, Keen, Richter, 
& Throckmorton (2013). However, the zero lower bound may not be the only non-linearity that 
central banks may be faced with. Changes in the Taylor rule in response to macroeconomic or 
political circumstances may produce a different type of non-linearity as described later in this paper. 
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Such examples reveal the benefits of having a technique at hand that can take account of non-
linearities and does not discard them as rare exceptions to an otherwise smoothly working economy. 
The financial crisis has demonstrated that output and inflation alone may not be the only relevant 
variables that central banks should take into consideration when assessing the state of the economy: 
Risks in the financial sector undermined the health of the economy and led to a sudden and sharp 
collapse in output. This paper goes one step in this direction by including additional economic 
information in the central bank’s reaction function, in this case the marginal cost spread of firms. As 
shown below, this variable contains information that can help monetary policy makers react more 
appropriately to shocks compared to a scenario in which they only pay attention to one single target.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of methods to numerically solve 
DSGE models that are subject to non-linearities and details the solution method used in this paper. 
Section 3.3 outlines the baseline model. Section 3.4 introduces two different types of non-linearities 
in order to demonstrate the strengths of discrete space models: the zero lower bound on the 
interest rate and a sudden change in the Taylor rule coefficients. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
 
3.2 Solution techniques for DSGE models with non-linearities 
3.2.1 Overview 
Only a few DSGE models have an analytic solution. Therefore, the solutions for most models need to 
be approximated using numerical methods. Heer & Maußner (2009, Table 1.3) characterize different 
numerical techniques based on two dimensions. First, they classify methods based on whether they 
approximate solutions to the model’s Euler equations or the policy functions. Second, they 
distinguish local methods that incorporate information about the true model, for example the 
deterministic steady state, at a specific location of the state space, from global methods that use 
information from the entire state space.  
The most common approach to solving DSGE models are so-called perturbation methods which 
belong to the local approximation category. The true function is approximated around the steady 
state by (log-) linearizing the system of difference equations, or using a Taylor-series approximation 
of order 2 (or in some cases of higher order). An approximate solution can then be computed 
analytically. These techniques can be easily implemented, for example by using the software 
Computing Non-Linearities in Monetary Policy with Policy Function Iteration Methods 77 
package Dynare9. Perturbation methods are relatively simple to set up, can be quickly computed, 
and are scalable in the sense that additional shocks, state and policy variables can be added without 
complicating the solution technique (Gaspar & Judd, 1997; Richter, Throckmorton, & Walker, 2013). 
These attractive characteristics mainly explain their popularity in DSGE modeling. However, 
perturbation methods require the system of equations governing the model’s dynamics to be 
sufficiently differentiable at a certain point (Heer & Maußner, 2009). Many real-world phenomena 
fail this condition. For instance, occasionally binding constraints such as non-negative investment 
(Heer & Maußner, 2009), collateral requirements (Krishnamurthy, 2003), the zero lower bound of 
the interest rate set by the central bank (Gavin et al., 2013), or liquidity constraints in banks (Freixas 
& Jorge, 2008) may all cause the approximation procedure to miss the true shape of the policy 
functions as one moves away from the steady state. Additional examples are models with 
endogenous regime change, recursive preferences, or heterogeneous agents (Richter et al., 2013).  
One technique to address such complications in a perturbation setup is penalty functions methods, 
pioneered by Luenberger (1973) and Judd (1998). Their essence is that they convert a constraint, 
such as a binding credit constraint, into a continuous penalty function that punishes choices that 
violate the constraint. The model can then be solved using perturbation methods. Rotemberg & 
Woodford (1999) use a penalty function approach to model the zero lower bound of the interest 
rate in an estimated  sticky price model. Preston & Roca (2007) analyze a real business cycle model 
with heterogeneous agents that are subject to a borrowing limit. Kim, Kim, & Kollmann (2005) apply 
a penalty function to an incomplete market model with infinite number of agents and exogenous 
borrowing constraints. Den Haan & De Wind (2012) incorporate a penalty function in a simple model 
of agents who face idiosyncratic income risk but can smooth their consumption with a non-negative 
amount of one-period bonds. However, Brandimarte (2006) warns that severe numerical difficulties 
may arise in penalty functions under certain conditions, and Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa, & Makarski 
(2012) report serious stability issues for higher-order stochastic models. 
Two approaches that are characterized in the Heer & Maußner (2009) framework as global and 
related to the policy functions are parameterized expectations and projection methods. Christiano & 
Fisher (2000) provide an excellent overview of these methods in the context of occasionally binding 
constraints. They show that the parameterized expectations approach (PEA) is a special case of 
projection methods. The PEA makes use of the fact that agents’ conditional expectations are time 
invariant with respect to the state space in the type of DSGE model used here and can be solved 
with the help of function approximation (Heer & Maußner, 2009). PEA was developed by Wright & 
                                                          
9
 Dynare is a software package used to calculate dynamic general equilibrium models using perturbation 
methods. For more information on Dynare, see www.dynare.org. 
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Williams (1982a; 1982b; 1984). An overview can be found in Marcet & Lorenzoni (1999). Projection 
methods, also called weighted residual solution methods, do not need to approximate agents’ 
conditional expectations, but can focus on the policy or value functions instead. They can be 
characterized along three dimensions: the approximation function, the weighting function, and the 
method for integration (Christiano & Fisher, 2000). Different solution techniques can be applied to 
each of these dimensions. As for the the approximation functions, spectral methods such as 
monomials or Chebychev polynomials (e.g. Judd, 1992; Judd, 1998) or finite element methods can be 
used (e.g. Reddy, 1993; McGrattan, 1996). The second dimension comprises least squares (e.g. Heer 
& Maußner, 2009), the Galerkin method (e.g. McGrattan, 1996), or collocation methods (e.g. 
Coleman, 1997; Anderson, Kim, & Yun, 2010). Integrals can be computed with quadrature methods 
or Monte Carlo integration. There are a number of methods to increase the numerical efficiency of 
the calculation, such as the Smolyak algorithm, but they are usually subject to certain issues, e.g. 
their inability to handle non-linearities (Krueger & Kubler, 2004; Brumm & Grill, 2010; Malin, 
Krueger, & Kubler, 2011). Projection methods can be used on discretized state spaces, though they 
are not limited to it (Judd, 1992). 
One alternative approach to solving DSGE models in this same category are discrete state space 
methods. Each of the model’s state variables s is discretized by a number of points ps, so that the 
model’s entire n-dimensional state space (with n being the number of state variables) consists of 
   ∏    
 
    grid-points, or nodes. One can then compute the value and policy functions on this 
grid. Value function iteration simply works by iteratively solving the maximization problem described 
by the Bellman equation, given an initial guess and a fixed state space grid (Heer & Maußner, 2009). 
This method has been employed, for example, by Christiano (1990). However, the convergence of 
this procedure is only linear and therefore time-consuming. Policy function iteration improves on 
value function iteration by updating the value function as if the newly calculated iteration of the 
policy function were followed forever. With this change, one can achieve a quadratic convergence 
(Heer & Maußner, 2009).  
Discrete state models, such as value or policy function iteration methods, are well suited to address 
non-linearities. However, the main drawback of these techniques is that they are not easily scalable, 
i.e. they run into computational limits as the number of state variables and shocks increases. For 
instance, a two-dimensional state space discretized with 20 points along each dimension will require 
the evaluation of 202 = 400 nodes. Adding two state variables will increase the number of nodes to 
204 = 160,000, and a model with ten state variables would encompass more than ten trillion nodes. 
This phenomenon is known as the ‘curse of dimensionality’. However, recent advances in both 
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computer hardware and software have made it possible to solve larger models than was possible 
just a few years ago. Some of the techniques used to speed up computing times will be described in 
the following section. These developments have brought forth studies on fiscal policy and fiscal 
limits (Bi, 2011; Bi, Leeper, & Leith, 2012; Davig, Leeper, & Walker, 2010; Davig, Leeper, & Walker, 
2011), regime switching in monetary and/or fiscal policy (Chung, Davig, & Leeper, 2007; Davig & 
Leeper, 2008), and the effects of inequality on the incidence of economic crises (Kumhof & Rancière, 
2010).  
One procedure to mitigate the computational burden of discrete state models is the endogenous 
grid method (EGM) developed by Carroll (2006). In contrast to the above mentioned variants, EGM 
does not start from a fixed grid over the state space, but over the control variables. Hence, the grid 
over the state space becomes endogenous. The advantage of this procedure is that it avoids 
rootfinding operations and thereby reduces computational demands. Additionally, EMG can take 
account of non-linearities such as occasionally binding collateral constraints very efficiently 
(Hintermaier & Koeniger, 2010). However, EGM has not been generalized to apply to models with 
more than two policy or state dimensions. Barillas & Fernández-Villaverde (2007) as well as Krueger 
& Ludwig (2007) extend the basic EGM to two control variables but only one endogenous state 
variable. Fella (2011) extends EGM to non-concave problems. Hintermaier & Koeniger (2010) use a 
special case of two endogenous state variables. This variant is generalized by Ludwig & Schön (2013), 
using Delaunay interpolation. Brumm & Grill (2010) develop a related endogenous grid method, but 
it cannot deal with discontinuities in the policy functions. Despite the attractive qualities of EGMs, 
these limitations make this method unsuitable for the purpose of this paper.  
Several studies compare different solutions methods. For example, Aruoba, Fernandez-Villaverde, & 
Rubio-Ramirez (2006) contrast the results of perturbation methods of different order, projection 
methods, and value function iteration. They find that there is a trade-off between speed and 
accuracy, with perturbation methods showing some instabilities, while projection methods are 
computationally intense. Jude (1996) also assesses perturbation and projection methods, and states 
that a combination of various methods could represent an effective approach. Kollmann, Maliar, 
Malin, & Pichler (2011) compare perturbation, projection, and so-called stochastic simulation 
methods and conclude that future research should develop hybrid methods that combine the 
strengths of different solution techniques. They put special emphasis on the fact that the solution 
method should depend on the specific problem at hand. Den Haan (2010) compares different 
methods for an incomplete markets model with an inequality constraint. Similar to Kollmann et al. 
(2011), he stresses that it is important to choose an algorithm that performs well in terms of 
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accuracy and speed given the particular model of interest. As decribed in the next section, the 
method used to simulate the model in this paper was carefully selected to strike the right balance 
between speed, accuracy, and flexibility, given the respective advantages and disadvantages of 
different solution techniques. 
 
3.2.2 Solution method for modeling non-linearities in monetary policy 
Based on policy function iteration, the solution technique used in this paper to solve dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models with substantial non-linearities was implemented in a recent 
paper and appertaining computer code by Richter et al. (2013). The authors reduce the significant 
startup costs in terms of programming and software expertise required to design such models by 
providing a user-friendly package of MATLAB functions. Their code allows for multi-core processing 
and the use of Fortran10 via MATLAB’s executable function. In contrast to Dynare, however, their 
code is not model-independent, meaning that most functions need to be manually adapted to the 
specific model that is to be simulated. For the purpose of this paper, their code is changed to fit the 
baseline model and its variations described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, but the general structure and 
characteristics remain. 
Before running the code with the correct model equations, one needs to set the parameters, 
discretize the state space, and calculate the steady state values of the variables. This paper follows 
Richter et al. (2013) in using the log-linear solution of the model to initialize the policy functions.  
On every node, the program calculates the optimal policy function given the initial or updated policy 
functions and the state grid. The optimization routine identifies the policy functions that satisfy the 
equilibrium conditions of the model, up to a specific convergence criterion. Note that there is a 
choice of the iteration technique. Time iteration uses future values of the policy function and 
employs a non-linear solver to find the roots of the system of equations. The advantage of this 
method is, under some circumstances, a relatively quick quadratic convergence. Alternatively, fixed-
point projection uses both current and future values of the policy functions. It does not necessarily 
satisfy the equilibrium system of equations for each iteration, but it can handle occasionally binding 
constraints since it does not rely on a non-linear solver. However, this comes at the cost of less 
reliability compared to time iteration (Den Haan, 2010). In most model versions, this paper uses the 
time iteration method, but fixed-point iteration is used as a robustness check and serves an 
important purpose in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
                                                          
10
 Fortran is a high-level programming language that is particularly applicable to numeric computation. 
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Policy function values also need to be calculated if they do not coincide with values that are 
consistent with the nodes of the discretized state space. For this purpose, the values need to be 
interpolated or, if the policy function is off the grid, extrapolated. There are several options 
available. First, the main method used in this paper is to simply linearly interpolate/extrapolate the 
functions. The advantage of this approach is its small computational burden and its stability. 
However, it can be imprecise if there is curvature in the policy functions. Nevertheless, in most cases 
analyzed in this paper, it has proven to be the most reliable and precise method. Second, Richter et 
al. (2013) make use of Chebyshev polynomials of third or fourth order to inter- and extrapolate the 
policy functions. While these polynomials can theoretically better approximate the functions off the 
nodes, this method proved unstable in this paper and is therefore not applied. Third, the 
approximation method can be based on monomials. The advantage of monomials is the fact that 
their domain is the entire real line, simplifying the algorithm, while for Chebyshev polynomials, it is 
an interval of the real line. Their disadvantage is the issue of multi-collinearity that can arise for 
higher degree monomials that may almost be identical (Heer & Maußner, 2009). Other alternatives 
include cubic splines or neural networks, but these options are not pursued here. 
Following the interpolation of the policy variables, the program calculates the t+1 values of the 
forward-looking variables. These values are needed to determine expectations at time t. Since they 
depend on all discretized realizations of the shock εt+1, one needs to numerically integrate over all of 
them to find the correct value. Two options for this integration are Gauss-Hermite quadrature and 
the Trapezoid rule. In the model at hand, the two methods yield very similar results, so the Gauss-
Hermite quadrature is applied in the benchmark model. In order to achieve a close approximation, 
different runs revealed that the number of nodes for the shock should not be less than 10.  
All models used in this paper were solved on an off-the shelf laptop with a two-core processor 
(2.40GHz) running on Windows 7 64-bit. The MATLAB version used was R2012a, 32-bit. Where 
possible, the Parallel Computing Toolbox was employed. This tool enables the user to operate 
several computer cores simultaneously when calculating for-loops instead of running them 
sequentially, greatly reducing computing times. 
 
 
3.3 Baseline model 
The framework is based on a New Keynesian model taken from Richter, Throckmorton, & Walker 
(2013) who adopt a standard textbook version from Walsh (2010). It is adapted by including firms’ 
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marginal cost spread in the central bank’s Taylor rule. This change reflects the insight that the 
financial situation and cost structure of companies may have indirect consequences for the conduct 
of monetary policy, and central banks may improve the outcomes of their targets by including 
additional information available in the economy (Castro, 2011). An additional change is the type of 
shock, which is assumed to be a shock to firms’ marginal cost instead of a tax shock. The model 
comprises a household sector, firms, and the government consisting of a monetary as well as fiscal 
authority.  
A representative household derives utility from consumption c, real money balances M/P, and 
leisure 1 - n, where n is labor hours. Lower case letters stand for real variables. Households maximize 
expected lifetime utilility by choosing sequences {                   }   
 : 
  ∑  
 {
    
   
   
  
    
   
   
  
(        ⁄ )
   
   
}                    (1) 
where β is the subjective discount factor, 1/σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/η is the 
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, and 1/κ is the semi elasticity of money demand. The household’s 
balance sheet constraint is 
            (    )(       
     )  
(             )
  
     (2) 
i stands for investment, b represents the stock of real government bonds, τ is a tax imposed on 
capital and labor income, w is the real wage, rk the rental price of capital, k the capital stock, r the 
interest rate, π is the gross inflation rate, and Π are real profits that households receive from firms.  
The law of motion for capital accumulation is 
   (   )         (3) 
with δ the rate of depreciation. 
Solving the household’s constrained optimization problem gives four first order conditions. The first 
order condition for labor is  
   
 
  
  (    )    (4) 
The first order condition for money is11 
   
   (      )  
    (5) 
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 See Walsh (2010) for a derivation of this result. 
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The bond and consumption Euler equations are  
       {(       )
      }  (6) 
     {(       )
 ((      )    
     )} (7) 
The model introduces price stickiness through an intermediate goods producing sector. Based on 
Dixit & Stiglitz (1977), intermediate goods y(i) are produced by a continuum i   [0 ,1] of 
monopolistically competitive firms with identical production technology 
  ( )      ( )
   ( )
     (8) 
and firms minimize their operating costs, shown in the following equation, based on the technology 
  ( )    
     ( )      ( ) (9) 
Following Ireland (1997), a representative final goods producing firm uses   ( ) units of 
intermediate goods in order to produce final composite good y according to 
    [∫   ( )
(   )    
 
 
]
  (   )
 (10) 
The nominal price for an intermediate good is   ( ); the nominal price for the final good is   . The 
final good firm maximizes profits by choosing    and   ( ) for all i  
     ∫   ( )  ( )
 
 
    (11) 
subject to the production technology in equation (10). The resulting first order condition is 
  ( )  [  ( )   ]
      (12) 
This is the demand equation of the final good firms for the intermediate good as a function of its 
final good and the relative price. Final good firms earn zero profits in equilibrium because of 
competition in the market for the final good. Real profits for intermediate firm i depend on the cost 
of adjusting its nominal price level,  ( ) (Rotemberg, 1982). Following Ireland’s (1997) 
representation, real profits for intermediate firm i can be modeled as 
  ( )  [(
  ( )
  
)
   
   (
  ( )
  
)
  
 
 
 
(
  ( )
 ̅    ( )
  )
 
]         (13) 
where ϕ is an adjustment cost parameter, Ψ is real marginal cost, and  ̅ is the steady state gross 
inflation rate.  
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Marginal cost can be calculated from the firm’s optimization problem, and is  
   
  
(   )
   
 
(   )     
       (14) 
where the shock is 
      (    
 )  (15) 
Intermediate firms maximize the expected discounted present value of their profits with respect to 
their price level  ( ):   ∑       ( )
 
   , where      ∏       
 
      is the stochastic discount factor 
with        and            (       )
 . In equilibrium, the first order condition derived from the 
profit maximization problem for the intermediate firms is 
 (
  
 ̅
  )
  
 ̅
 (   )         [      (
    
 ̅
  )
    
 ̅
    
  
]  (16) 
The government’s flow budget constraint is given by 
        (  
          )   ̅  
              
  
  (17) 
with  ̅ a constant level of discretionary spending. The monetary and fiscal authorities follow these 
policy rules 
    ̅ (
  
  
)
 
(
  
 ̅
)
 
  (18) 
    ̅ (
    
  
)
 
 (19) 
with π* and b* the target levels of inflation and debt.  ̅,  ̅, and  ̅ are the steady state interest rate, 
marginal cost, and tax rate, and φ, ω, and γ are parameters. The inclusion of firm’s marginal cost in 
the Taylor rule is a deviation from the Richter et al. (2013) model, and signifies the choices central 
banks have in including additional economic information in their decision process. In the current 
setup, it is assumed that marginal cost can be fully observed by policy makers. Marginal cost enters 
positively in the Taylor rule because increases in firms’ costs are inflationary. That is, the setup is 
akin to a cost-push situation in which firms pass through cost increases they incur to the prices they 
charge their customers, given the intermediate and final goods producing structure in this model. 
The aggregate resource constraint is  
       ̅  [   (
  
 ̅
  )
 
  ]     (20) 
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The simulated model comprises equations (3) to (7), the production function (8) aggregated across 
firms, equation (14) and equations (16) to (20). There are five state variables (the four lagged 
variables ‒ real debt, the interest rate, money, capital ‒ as well as the shock). The choice of policy 
variables is not unique. Here, marginal cost, inflation, and the rental price of capital, are taken as 
policies. The model is calibrated as described in Table 3.1. Identical or similar parameter values as in 
Richer et al. (2013) have been chosen. 
 
Table 3.1. Calibration of the baseline model 
Parameter Value Description Parameter Value Description 
α 0.33 Cost share of capital    1.002 Inflation target 
β 0.99 Discount factor φ 1.50 Inflation coefficient 
δ 0.10 Depreciation rate ω 0.50 Marginal cost coefficient 
η 1.00 Inverse Frisch elasticity    0.16 Government spending share 
κ 1.00 Inverse interest rate elasticity τ 0.21 Steady state tax rate 
θ 7.67 Price elasticity of demand γ 0.20 Debt coefficient 
vel 3.80 Money velocity     0.01 Standard deviation of shock 
   0.33 Steady state labor tol 10
-7
 Algorithm convergence criterion 
ϕ 10.0 Rotemberg adjustment cost λ 0.50 Algorithm update coefficient 
  
 
The baseline model is estimated using time iteration, linear interpolation, and the Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature to integrate over the shock realizations. Further below, the robustness of some of these 
specifications is assessed by comparing the Euler equation errors of alternative methods.  
The impulse responses (Figure 3.1, solid lines) show the behavior of the variables in the baseline 
model for a shock with a standard deviation of 0.01, with a negative shock imposed. The state 
variables are discretized with 11 points each, yielding a total number of 115 = 161,051 nodes over 
which to calculate the optimal policy functions. The tolerance level used is 10-7. In addition, the 
impulse responses with no marginal cost term in the Taylor rule (i.e. ω = 0) are included for 
comparison (dashed lines). 
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Figure 3.1. Impulse responses to a negative marginal cost shock in the baseline model 
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Note: Solid lines reflect Taylor rule with ω = 0.5. Dashed lines reflect Taylor rule with ω = 0. 
 
An exogenous negative shock to firms’ marginal cost is good news for the economy. Output 
increases since there is more demand for firms’ products as inflation is lower. This reflects the fact 
that marginal cost and inflation are positively correlated in this model. If marginal cost declines, 
firms pass it on to consumers. The central bank is aware of this relationship, and therefore marginal 
cost is included in the Taylor rule in this model to begin with. As expected, the interest rate drops 
since inflationary pressures are subdued. Consumption is up, reflecting the fact that consumers can 
spend more money in this benign environment. Investment is up initially, though there is some 
undershooting in subsequent periods. The capital stock increases and returns slowly back to its 
steady state level since investment does not keep up with depreciation. Labor, the real wage rate, 
and the rental price of capital are all up. The tax rate declines, even though tax revenues go up 
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initially because the government receives higher payments from labor and capital. The higher tax 
revenue allows the government to decrease its debt burden, and real debt slowly converges back to 
its steady state level. The increase in money is the flipside of the lower interest rate.  
The impulse responses with and without the marginal cost term in the Taylor rule are fairly similar 
for most variables. However, including the term helps the central bank to achieve better outcomes 
for its main policy target, the inflation rate, which deviates by 30 basis points less from the steady 
state in the first period compared to the set of impulse responses that does not include the marginal 
cost term. Additionally, the central bank needs to cut the interest rate by 22 basis points less in the 
first period to achieve this outcome. Similarly, money increases by 22 basis points less in the 
marginal-cost-augmented Taylor rule scenario. These results show that including additional 
information available in the economy, such as the cost structure of firms, can support central banks 
to stick to their targets more closely after economic shocks compared to a case in which they focus 
on a more narrow set of variables. 
The model can be estimated using different techniques. Euler equation errors (EEE) are one way to 
compare the goodness of fit of different methods (Heer & Maußner, 2009; Richter et al., 2013). 
Figure 3.2 compares the EEE of three different techniques: 
 the residuals of a log-linear representation of the model. This method could also be 
implemented using Dynare with a first order approximation (“log-linear”). 
 the residuals of a model using fixed-point iteration with a monomial basis (“FM”) 
 the residuals of a model using time iteration with linear interpolation (“TL”). This method 
was also used to compute the impulse responses in Figure 3.1. 
The scale is logarithmic with a base of 10. The number of nodes to simulate the EEE is increased to 
13 in order to see the performance of the different methods off the original grid on which the 
approximations were performed. The first row shows the EEE for the interest rate policy, while the 
second row displays the EEE for the price level policy function. The columns correspond to the state 
variables. 
In general, the TL method has the smallest EEE. This is especially the case for values that are further 
away from the steady state. The zigzag movement of the TL methods stems from the fact that the 
linear interpolation is imprecise if the functions experience curvature. Nevertheless, in the majority 
of cases, the off-grid errors are smaller compared with the other techniques.  
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Figure 3.2. Euler equation errors for different estimation methods of the baseline model 
 
Note: x-axis in percent deviation from steady state, y-axis logarithmic with base 10 
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3.4 Non-linearities in monetary policy 
This section introduces two different types of non-linearities in the model. In contrast to 
perturbation methods, the method used in this paper can take care of non-linearities or 
discontinuities in a sense that there can be abrupt changes in regions further away from the steady 
state. 
 
3.4.1 Zero lower bound on the interest rate 
In response to the financial crisis, several central banks around the world reduced their respective 
policy rates. Following a conventional Taylor rule, the severity of the shock, however, might have 
required short-term rates that were substantially below zero (Asso, Kahn, & Leeson, 2010). Policy 
rates are believed, though, to be subject to the zero lower bound, since economic agents can always 
hold cash instead of suffering from a negative nominal interest rate, should it be implemented. This 
bound has implications for other economic variables. In order to simulate the zero lower bound, the 
minimum value that the interest variable can assume is set to 1.005. This number reflects the fact 
that central banks cannot typically push down the interest rate completely to zero, but it is usually 
slightly positive. For example, as of writing, the Federal Reserve in the US has set a range for the 
Federal funds rate of 0 to 0.25%, and the respective numbers for Japan are 0 to 0.1%, instead of the 
traditional point target. This is due to the fact that it is difficult for central banks to bring the short-
term policy rate completely to zero.  
The simulation procedure is similar to the one implemented in Richter et al. (2013). In a first step, 
the model is simulated using the time iteration method without imposing the binding constraint. The 
result is an updated policy function for the inflation rate on every node although the interest rate 
might actually be below zero. In a second step, the nodes for which this is the case are determined, 
and these nodes are re-calculated with the fixed-point method and the zero lower bound in place. 
Note that the nodes that are calculated with the fixed-point method do not necessarily satisfy the 
equilibrium conditions for all future values. However, using this initial two-step procedure allows 
calculating a relatively precise guess for the initial values of the policy functions. In a third step, 
these initial guesses are used to compute the optimal policy functions with the time iteration 
method and the zero lower bound in place. Hence, in the third step, the equilibrium conditions are 
fulfilled for all periods on all nodes. 
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Each respective step is repeated for every iteration until the convergence criterion is met. To 
improve the stability of the algorithm, the updated values are calculated as a linear combination of 
the old and updated policy function values, using an update weight of λ = 0.5. 
The advantage of this three-step method is that it ensures both the stability of the algorithm and can 
handle an occasionally binding constraint by using fixed-point iteration. Time iteration alone would 
not ensure the stability of the algorithm, since relatively precise initial guesses for the policy 
functions are necessary, and time iteration has difficulties to incorporate non-linear constraints since 
it relies on a non-linear solver for the current policies, while fixed-point iteration does not (Richter et 
al., 2013). 
Whether there are any noticeable differences between the impulse responses with and without 
binding constraints depends both on the number of binding nodes as well as on the location of the 
nodes where the lower elasticity is in effect. In general, the larger the shock the lower is the weight 
on the outcome. Hence, if all the nodes where the borrowing constraint binds are located far from 
the steady state, their small weight will not make any discernible expectational difference on the 
future development of the forward-looking variables, and therefore the impulse responses will look 
identical. As the number of nodes on which the constraints binds increases and as they are located 
closer to the steady state where they receive more weight, the differences in the impulse responses 
with and without a zero lower bound will increase. 
Another way to illustrate the differences for a specific variable is by directly comparing the values 
calculated on each node. Since every variable is a five-dimensional object (one dimension for every 
state variable), the values of some state variables have to be fixed to produce meaningful graphs. 
Figures 3.3a-c show the effect of a zero lower bound on the policy variables, holding the state 
variables mt-1, kt-1 and the shock constant at 5% below, 5% above, and 5% below their steady state 
values, respectively. This produces a three-dimensional chart in the state variables bt-1 (x-axis), rt-1 (y-
axis), and the policy variable of interest ‒ marginal cost (psit), inflation (pit) or the rental price of 
capital (rkt) ‒ on the z-axis. The angle is chosen to best reveal the interesting properties of the 
surface. One can clearly see a kink in the surface, which represents the lower bound on the interest 
rate. Taking inflation policy as an example, the figure shows that inflation is lower where the zero 
lower bound is in effect (in the south-east section of the surface) compared to what it would 
otherwise be. The reason is that since the interest rate is higher than appropriate due to the zero 
lower bound, inflation is more subdued than it would optimally be. 
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Figure 3.3a. Marginal cost with a zero lower bound 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3b. Inflation with a zero lower bound 
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Figure 3.3c. Rental price of capital with a zero lower bound 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Changes in the Taylor rule 
Central banks are embedded in a certain political context. Even if their independence is guaranteed 
by law, pressure might arise under specific circumstances that tend to push monetary policy making 
into a particular direction. The global financial crisis and the crisis in Europe can illustrate this notion. 
For example, the United Kingdom has fallen back into recession several times since the start of the 
crisis, despite unprecedented quantitative easing by the Bank of England. The UK government was 
dissatisfied to some degree with the Bank of England’s record, and changed its remit in 2013 to give 
it more leeway in choosing its policies in order to respond appropriately to the economic 
circumstances. Another example is the European Central Bank, which only has to adhere to an 
inflation target, with no statutory role for output stabilization. In the wake of the European crisis, 
several observers and politicians asked whether a dual mandate with respect to both inflation and 
output would lead to better outcomes for many euro area countries that faced large slumps in 
economic activity. However, no explicit changes to the ECB’s remit have been made so far, even if it 
is conceivable that the ECB may respond differently de facto to output and inflation than before the 
crisis.  
Such situations of changes in central banks’ behavior may be captured by modifications in the 
central bank’s Taylor rule if certain economic circumstances prevail. Setting up a very simple 
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example, one may presume that, in the current setup, central banks may react less to inflationary 
pressures if output is far below its steady state. This may occur, as described above, if politicians 
increase the pressure on a central bank to be more accommodative after the economy has suffered 
a large negative shock. This abrupt change in central banks’ reaction may be modeled as a reduction 
of the Taylor rule coefficients. Hence, given a state of the economy with very low output, a central 
bank reacts less restrictive to inflation and marginal cost than it otherwise would. Martin & Milas 
(2004) find a related non-linear response of monetary policy in the UK when inflation is far from the 
target. In their example, the central bank reacts more aggressively to inflation, not less, but the 
difference is due to the fact that the shock in this paper is assumed to be of a cost-push nature. The 
underlying idea of a non-linear change in the Taylor rule remains, though.  
One additional realistic feature of this setup is that the change may occur suddenly, for example 
mimicking politicians who become aware of the issue and demand changes at one specific time. The 
consequence is that there is no comparatively smooth kink in the policy functions as in the previous 
section, but a sudden discontinuity or break. It is possible to ensure a smooth transition or kink by 
adjusting the Taylor rule so as to avoid the break, but this may actually be a less realistic setup in a 
real world context.  
The coefficients of the Taylor rule are adjusted from 1.5 to 1.3 for inflation, and from 0.5 to 0.3 for 
marginal cost to reflect such changes. The same simulation strategy as in Section 3.4.2 is chosen. 
First, the model is simulated with time-iteration without imposing a change in the Taylor rule. Then, 
the nodes are identified for which output falls below a level of 0.455. This value reflects a large 
negative output gap with respect to the steady state value of 0.471. In a second step, the policy 
functions for these nodes are re-calculated with the changed Taylor rule coefficients in place using 
fixed-point iteration. Third, the results are taken as initial guesses for the policy functions, and the 
model is simulated with the time-iteration method and the coefficient changes for certain output 
values in place. 
Figures 3.4a-c show the effect on the policy functions for an interesting subset of the grid when the 
output restriction is in place on some nodes. The state variables mt-1, kt-1 and the shock are held 
constant at its steady state value, 5% below, and 5% above its steady state, and the variables bt-1 (x-
axis), rt-1 (y-axis), and policy variable (z-axis) are shown in the graph, respectively. One can clearly see 
a discontinuity that reflects the change in the Taylor rule coefficients. For example, inflation is higher 
on the nodes where the change is in place, signifying the more accommodative response of 
monetary policy. As in the zero lower bound case above, perturbation methods would be unable to 
Computing Non-Linearities in Monetary Policy with Policy Function Iteration Methods 95 
properly take account of this discontinuity because they rely on a smooth function that gets 
approximated around the steady state. 
 
Figure 3.4a. Marginal cost with a change in the Taylor rule 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4b. Inflation with a change in the Taylor rule 
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Figure 3.4c. Rental price of capital with a change in the Taylor rule 
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper has demonstrated the strengths of policy function iteration as a method to model non-
linearities in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Two non-linearities and their effects on 
macroeconomic variables have been analyzed. First, a zero lower bound on the interest rate has 
been shown to produce a kink in the policy functions that would be missed in a simulation using 
perturbation methods. Second, changes in the Taylor rule in response to certain macroeconomic 
conditions result in a discontinuity in the policy functions. The accuracy of different simulation 
methods has been compared using Euler equation errors, and in general, time iteration using linear 
approximation has proven to produce the most accurate and stable results. 
The global financial crisis has demonstrated that monetary policy can be subject to a variety of non-
linearities with potentially substantial consequences for the broader economy. This paper is a step 
toward modeling such non-linearities as they may arise in central banking. Further research may 
concentrate on introducing heterogeneous agents and financial intermediaries. This will necessitate 
the introduction of more state and policy variables as well as additional shocks, which will 
exponentially increase the computational burdens. Several steps could be taken to keep such 
demands manageable. First, researchers could make it easier to use Fortran, which is a powerful 
language when it comes to numeric computation. Second, MATLAB allows users to employ parallel 
computing not only with respect to computer processors, but also with respect to graphics 
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processing units (GPUs), using the right hardware. This is much more cost-effective than the 
computer cores alternative. Third, MATLAB also allows running models on computer clusters, grids, 
and clouds by means of its Distributed Computing Server (MDCS). This seems especially suitable for 
large-scale models. Future research could establish best practices for computationally intensive 
programs using one or several of these potential avenues. 
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